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Three studies examined the relationship between working memory capacity (WMC) and 
individual differences in emotionality. Applying a flexible cognition approach, 
conditions of cognitive narrowing (low WMC) and cognitive broadening (high WMC) 
were predicted based on (1) the motivational properties of affect states (action-
deliberation tradeoff) and (2) negative-positive emotionality. Namely, high-arousal 
states (anxiety/excitement) were predicted to restrict WMC (action focus) whereas low-
arousal states (sadness/calm) were proposed to expand WMC (deliberation focus) in 
highly emotional individuals (negative/positive emotionality). In Study 1, behavioral 
inhibition and neuroticism were associated with generally high WMC under baseline 
conditions. Thus, negative emotionality was associated with high cognitive-control 
ability. In studies that followed, participants mentally relived a past emotional event 
(mood induction) prior to completing the automated operation span task (WMC 
measure). In Study 2, high trait anxiety was associated with low WMC in an anxious 
(but not calm) mood condition. Thus, anxious conditions compromised WMC in 
anxiety-sensitive individuals. In Study 3, negative (positive) emotionality was 
associated with low (high) WMC in a nervous condition but high (low) WMC in a sad 
condition. Additionally, positive emotionality was associated with low WMC in an 
excited condition. Calm mood had no discernible effect on WMC. These findings 
highlight a dynamic relationship between emotion and executive functioning, and 
implications for self and emotional experiences are addressed. Importantly, these data 
suggest that executive functioning, considered critical to successful emotion regulation, 





Emotionality and Working Memory: Feelings Take Control 
 
The current investigation examines the influence of mood states on working 
memory capacity (WMC) across three studies. Mood was hypothesized to have its 
strongest effects on the cognition of individuals high in emotionality (e.g., high 
extraversion or neuroticism) whose cognitive-affective experiences are rooted in 
motivation-based temperaments (e.g., approach or avoidance; Elliot & Thrash, 2002). 
The cognitive-control abilities described as important in regulating emotions (Ochsner 
& Gross, 2005) should be altered by current emotional state, which aligns with a 
primacy-of-affect hypothesis (Zajonc, 1980). Moreover, these underlying processes are 
theorized to have important implications for the self. Overall, this approach applies a 
relatively functionalist perspective that treats cognitive-affective reactions as more or 
less “optimal” based on the emotional context (e.g., Campos, Mumme, Kermoian, & 
Campos, 1994; Mischel & Shoda, 1995).  It also challenges a general view that 
cognitive control, emotional stability, and positive emotionality are unambiguously 
positive traits. 
Emotional Experience 
  The present research borrows from Barrett’s (2006a, 2011, 2013) constructivist 
approach to emotion, which utilizes conceptual act theory (CAT). In CAT, emotion 
generation involves a core affective system and a conceptual system. The core affective 
system is described by the circumplex model (Russell & Barrett, 1999), which treats 
qualities of valence and arousal as two separate (orthogonal) dimensions of affect (see 
Figure 1). Thus, at each moment, a person feels relatively pleasant-unpleasant at some 





and are not restricted to human experience (LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998). Affect can 
operate automatically and unconsciously (e.g., Clore, Storbeck, Robinson, & Centerbar, 
2005; Öhman, 1999; Winkielman & Berridge, 2004), influencing the quality and 
content of cognitive processing (Forgas, 1995, 2013; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Affect, 
therefore, plays an important supporting role in cognitive structure, although its 
contribution often goes unnoticed (Zajonc, 1980, 1984). Importantly, affective arousal 
serves to “interrupt” cognitive processing by capturing attention (Simon, 1967), which 
makes salient current feelings (Barrett, 2011) and prioritizes goals (e.g., approach or 
avoidance motivation; J. A. Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Indeed, high-arousal states 
(anxiety, excitement) are often regarded as motivationally intense whereas low arousal 
states (sadness, calm) are rather amotivational (e.g., Carver, 2006; Harmon-Jones, Price, 
& Gable, 2012).  
Emotional experience is formed in the conceptual system (cf. Barrett, Wilson-
Mendenhall, & Barsalou, in press), which involves the categorization of an experience 
into a discrete emotion. An emotion has a cognitive-affective signature, prototypic 
features, and connected situational cues. These associated features provide the bases for 
semantic categorization, including the verbal labeling of an emotion (Barrett, 2006a). 
The categorical features of an emotion are established and defined by social norms, 
which allow shared conceptual knowledge about emotions to transcend culture. For 
example, the emotion label “sad” is associated with feelings (e.g., negative affect; 
feeling “blue”), behavioral characteristics (e.g., frowning expression, tears), and 
associated cognitions (e.g., low self-esteem, hopelessness). Accordingly, while qualities 





to be qualitatively consistent (e.g., everyone experiences sadness basically in the same 
way).    
 Emotion concepts not only allow people to identify and label an emotional 
experience in a top-down fashion, but the process also works in reverse. Contextual 
features of an event activate emotions “bottom-up” (e.g., Bargh & Williams, 2007; 
Niedenthal, Barsalou, Ric, & Krauth-Gruber, 2005). Functionally, this allows 
individuals to “take on” an appropriate emotion based on social norms. Contextual cues 
automatically trigger emotion regulation. By contrast, emotion dysregulation refers 
principally to the inability to control emotions to meet normative standards (e.g., 
sadness [or joy] in situations that do not call for sadness [or joy]).  
  Individual differences in emotionality are postulated to initiate in the core 
affective system (i.e., temperament) and give rise to dissociable emotional experiences. 
Emotionality is characterized by high sensitivity to positive and/or negative stimulation 
(Larsen & Diener, 1987) and prepotent motivational drives (e.g., approach/avoidance 
orientation; Corr, 2004). Sensitivity potentiates frequent and intense affective reactions 
that, upon onset, modulate cognitive processing (discussed below) and guide attention 
toward emotion-relevant content (e.g., emotion identification and self-evaluation). 
Thus, this perspective implicates self in emotional experience by assuming that emotion 
often is categorized and generated by the dialogical self (Hermans, Kempan, & van 
Loon, 1992). The self asks, “How do I feel?” and, “How should I feel?” (see also, self-
guides; Higgins, 1987, 1997). Lastly, a singular environmental cue (e.g., loss or failure) 
is posited to engender disparate cognitive-affective reactions; therefore, semantic labels 





(e.g., sadness in actuality is not felt the same in each individual). Thus, affective 
feelings accord with the affect circumplex (i.e., affect has valence and arousal), but 
people’s conceptual representations of affect states do not. After all, individuals’ labels 
for affective experience (person-level representations) do not map directly onto the 
circumplex structure (group-level representations; e.g., Barrett, 2004; Feldman, 1995). 
Consequently, affective experiences can be mislabeled or misattributed (Schachter & 
Singer, 1962) and experienced as mixed (Larsen & McGraw, 2011). Thus, introspection 
paints a rather imprecise picture of core affect differences (e.g., self-report issues; 
Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007; Kahneman, 1999; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Robinson & Clore, 2002) that more likely reveal themselves in cognitive-affective 
reactions.  
Executive Functioning and Cognitive Control 
 Humans place great value on self-control, which largely refers to the self’s 
agency over emotions (emotion regulation; Gross, 2011) and impulses (self-regulation; 
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Vohs & Baumeister, 2011). 
Emotion regulation ability typically refers to the capacity to up-regulate positive 
emotion and down-regulate negative emotion (Gross & Johns, 2003). Because negative 
attitudes are rooted in negative feelings (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; LaPiere, 1934), 
generally negative emotionality should promote chronic access to negative self-beliefs 
in the self-concept (e.g., DeMarree, Petty, & Brinol, 2007; Markus & Wurf, 1987; 
Strachman & S. Gable, 2006). This is consistent with research showing that “online” 
self-esteem judgments (evaluation of the experiencing self) generally are based on how 





Baumeister, 2000; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Consequently, abilities to down-regulate 
negative emotions appear key in becoming “master of one’s psychological domain,” a 
so-called optimal self characterized by stable high self-esteem (Kernis, 2003; Kernis, 
Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000). 
Self-control is managed through executive functioning (Baumeister, 
Schmeichel, & Vohs, 2003), which presumably takes place in the central executive of 
working memory (Baddeley, 1986). As with Freud’s (1923/1960) personality executive 
(Ego), the self is the captain of working memory, managing incoming information (e.g., 
threat) with stored knowledge (e.g., self-beliefs) in order to regulate behavior. Indeed, 
self-regulation literature is influenced heavily by models of ego depletion (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007), a strength 
model positing that self-control requires mental energies (or resources) that become 
taxed from prolonged control efforts, which leads to limited self-control on subsequent 
tasks (for a review, Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). That is, the brain 
essentially acts like a muscle pushing away impulses until it reaches fatigue. More 
recently, Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) offer an alternative model by describing self-
control failure in attentional and motivational terms. They suggest that individuals are 
motivated to control the self on tasks early in a lab session but are less inclined to do so 
in later tasks unless there are added incentives. That is, people’s willingness to exercise 
restraint at Time 1 (e.g., behavioral inhibition) is replaced by reward seeking at Time 2 
(e.g., behavioral approach). Self-control in fact does maintain across tasks when a 
person is given added incentives (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003), affirms the self 





Walton, 2010), which would be impossible if finite mental resources truly were tapped. 
Hence, as feelings change, self-regulation motives change as well.  
Similarly, research on delay of gratification in children suggests that successful 
self-control is aided by cognitive distraction or abstraction, because focusing on the 
rewards of an immediately gratifying action arouses appetitive drives that are difficult 
to inhibit (Mischel & Baker, 1975). Importantly, preschool children better able to 
“cool” their “hot” desires for immediate gratification cognitively via attentional 
strategies (e.g., thinking about something else or abstractly envisioning the benefits of 
restraint) are particularly adept both socially and cognitively later on in life (Mischel, 
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). This suggests a trait-based component of self-control arises 
from cognitive factors (viz., attentional strategies) that effectively manage affective 
drives.  
Along these lines, as a means to capture natural control abilities, social-
personality researchers borrowed from the cognitive literature measures of working 
memory capacity (WMC), which tap into executive functioning abilities (cf. Barrett, 
Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). One popular 
measure of WMC is the operation span task (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989; 
Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). The OSPAN is a complex-span task that 
captures cognitive-updating ability based on how effectively an individual remembers a 
number of items (e.g., letters) while simultaneously performing a secondary task 
(calculating mathematical operations). To achieve high WMC, one must be able 
actively to maintain and manipulate a number of items in working memory through 





current math problems) and to disengage from goal-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., old items 
and distractors); for reviews, see Rosen and Engle (1998) and Unsworth and Engle 
(2007). Hence, WMC is more specifically a reflection of one’s ability to control 
attention effectively than an index of cognitive space per se (Engle, 2002; Kane, 
Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001).  
Trait-based WMC measures have been shown to moderate a number of 
phenomena requiring self- and emotional-control (Schmeichel & Tang, 2014). High 
WMC mitigates the detrimental effects of resources lost from self-control (Schmeichel, 
Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008), automatic/inference-based processing (Hofmann, 
Gschwender, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008), stereotype threat (Régner, Smelding, 
Gimmig, Thinus-Blanc, Monteil, & Huguet, 2010), and anxiety (Johnson & Gronlund, 
2009). Moreover, individual differences in emotionality, namely trait inabilities to 
control negative emotion, are described as a consequence of ineffective cognitive 
control strategies in Gross’s emotion-regulation model (Gross & Thompson, 2007; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Effective self-regulators have greater ability to think negative 
feelings away.  Specifically, successful regulators cognitively reappraise emotions 
before they get out of hand. For example, reappraisers may disengage with the source of 
negative emotions (e.g., a failed relationship) and focus instead on a new goal (e.g., the 
opportunity to enter into more fulfilling relationship), leading to better emotional and 
behavioral outcomes. Consistent with this notion, emotion-reappraisal ability is 
positively correlated with WMC (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012). In 





Kane, & Engle, 2003). Collectively, a theme converges on a hypothesis that self-control 
extends from traits related to cognitive ability.  
Overall, research indicates that the controlled attentional processes necessary to 
achieve high WMC scores are important in establishing and maintaining a controlled, 
emotionally stable, and rational self. Such an inference is problematic, however, 
because individual difference research is correlational. First, the connection between 
high WMC and other control outcomes may extend in part from differences in effort 
rather than natural abilities, wherein some participant volunteers simply are more 
motivated to work harder on difficult and tedious tasks across an experimental session 
(viz., more neurotic individuals). Second, it is debatable whether WMC reflects stable 
trait abilities or instead varies as a function of contextual features (cf. Ilkowska & 
Engle, 2010). This introduces the possibility of WMC instability or, more intriguingly, 
WMC flexibility. Namely, feelings (e.g., emotion and impulses) usually are treated as 
constants in studies of cognitive control, which ignores the role of affect in shaping 
cognitive processing (cf. Schwarz & Clore, 2007). For example, high-arousal emotions 
may override sophisticated cognitive functions in a fashion relatable to the strength 
model of self-control. Moreover, affect conveys motivational properties (e.g., high/low 
approach or avoidance orientations; Carver, 2006) that systematically influence 
executive functioning (e.g., decreasing or increasing WMC) via attention-based 
processes (e.g., narrowed or broadened attentional focus; Förster & Dannenberg, 2010). 
In that case, more highly emotional individuals likely show cognitive-affective benefits 
in circumstances in which emotionally-stable individuals display signs of 





 The current perspective assumes that the cognitive-affective foundation of the 
self varies in emotionality, such that some individuals have more control over their 
emotions because their emotions are relatively low in strength. As such, the control 
advantage goes to low-emotional individuals, but this is not “optimal” functioning. 
Individuals high in emotionality have an emotional advantage such that affective 
sources guide cognitive processing and, in a sense, losing control of self is a great 
strength. In other words, there is no single optimal cognitive-affective self, but rather a 
number of circumstances in which emotionality produces advantageous or 
disadvantageous outcomes (cf. Campos et al., 1994; Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004; 
Zajonc, 1965).     
Cognitive-Affective Processing 
 A basic assumption in the current perspective is that controlled working 
memory processes are rooted in attentional effects that operate automatically in 
response to different emotion states (cf. Pessoa, 2009). Engle (2002) proposes that 
working memory is a process of “executive attention,” which here is said to be 
influenced by affect-mediated attention, just as in global-local processing (Förster & 
Dannenberg, 2010; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010). This process allows for flexibility 
with cognitive scope adjusting from broad-to-narrow focus (Harmon-Jones, Gable, & 
Price, 2012) in order to meet situational demands.  
 Affect influences cognitive processing in several ways (cf. Schwarz & Clore, 
2007), but most germane to the current topic is the fact that affect states sometimes 
broaden, but other times narrow, cognition. On the attentional level, broadening is 





with local-orientation (seeing the trees). Gasper and colleagues showed that global- and 
local-orientation increased under conditions of positive (happy) and negative (sad) 
moods, respectively (Gasper, 2004; Gasper & Clore, 2002). In addition, negative 
emotionality (e.g., high trait anxiety or depression) is associated with baseline local-
orientation whereas positive-emotionality (e.g., optimism) is associated with global-
orientation (Basso, Schefft, Ris, & Dember, 1996; Derryberry & Reed, 1998) 
Global-local orientations have implications for processing everyday stimuli and 
executive functioning as well. High-arousal emotion has long been theorized to localize 
attention (e.g., cue utilization theory; Easterbrook, 1959), especially toward the source 
of an anxiety-provoking threat; for example, angry faces (Öhman, Lundqvist, & 
Esteves, 2001), weapons (E. Loftus, G. Loftus, & Messo, 1987), and worries (Beck & 
Clark, 1997). In fact, chronic localization (“locking onto”) negative thoughts (e.g., 
worries) may be the most problematic symptom of trait anxiety (M. Eysenck, 1992). By 
contrast, Fredrickson (1998, 2001) suggests that positive emotions provide an affective 
context in which cognition broadens-and-builds. Positive moods are associated with 
creative problem solving by increasing access to a relatively broad set of items for use 
in categorization (cf. Isen, 1999). Global-local orientation also appears to influence 
memory. Storbeck and Clore (2005) found that negative-mood inductions (e.g., local-
orientation) decrease the rate of false memories in comparison to positive-mood 
inductions (e.g., global-orientation) on Deese-Roediger-McDermott (“DRM”) lists 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995), which was proposed to extend from directed attention 
toward each sequentially presented item during encoding when participants were in 





Recent models of motivation reflect this increased importance placed on 
cognitive broadening and narrowing by incorporating global-local processing to goal 
pursuit.  In Förster and Dannenberg’s (2010) global versus local model, regulatory 
focus influences cognitive scope. Prevention focus (avoidance orientation) narrows 
cognition and promotion focus (approach orientation) broadens cognition perceptually 
(global-local processing) and conceptually (creativity and categorization), and at state- 
and trait-levels (e.g., Förster & Higgins, 2005; Friedman & Förster, 2001, 2005). 
Alternatively, Harmon-Jones and colleagues (2012) argue in their motivational intensity 
model that states high in motivational intensity (high approach or high avoidance) 
produce narrowed cognition (local orientation) whereas less intense states (low 
approach or low avoidance) produce broadened cognition (global orientation). Evidence 
for their model primarily extends from attentional broadening/narrowing in positive 
states. For example, Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008) showed that pictures of desserts 
(high approach) increased local-orientation, whereas pictures of cute cats (low 
approach) increased global-orientation. Similarly, individuals anticipating winning 
money early in a task (pre-goal; high approach) had local-orientations that flipped to 
global-orientations after the money was won (post-goal, low approach; Gable & 
Harmon-Jones, 2011). These effects are demonstrated at the neurological level as well. 
Local-orientation during motivationally intense positive states corresponds with 
asymmetric left-hemispheric brain activation (Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009), which is 
associated with approach-orientation (Davidson, 1993; Harmon-Jones, 2003). Lastly, 
local-orientation during high-approach states is moderated by behavioral approach 





particularly sensitive to reward cues that elicit intense motives that narrow cognitive 
scope (Experiment 3, Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008).  
 Action-Deliberation Tradeoff. Executive functioning traditionally is believed 
to process information in a manner conceptually similar to a cognitive scope, such that 
emotionally arousing states restrict cognition in a narrowed fashion (e.g., optimal-
arousal; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). The evolutionary advantage of complex cognitive 
abilities (e.g., comparing the utility of a number of potential choices) becomes 
disadvantageous in times of threat. The creature evaluating whether fight, flight, or 
fleeing is the optimal defense in the face of predation is eaten while the creature whose 
automatic reaction to flee scurries away. Presumably, (1) fear restricts attention in 
working memory to direct attention toward the source of the threat and (2) retrieves 
from memory the quickest reasonable solution to the current problem (e.g., Klein, 
1993). The motivation to avoid a negative outcome (avoidance drive) efficiently 
overrides the inclination to deliberate over an optimal solution (i.e., activate alternative 
solutions from long-term memory). Motivational intensity affect states cognitively lock 
people onto their goals, promoting action over deliberation. Working memory 
restrictions viewed as functional for avoidance goals presumably extend to approach 
goals as well. Approach-oriented affect (e.g., excitement and enthusiasm) focuses an 
individual on a goal (acquiring rewards), and acting on a reasonable solution overrides 
deliberation. For example, over-deliberating on the best way to acquire friendship from 
a new acquaintance may have its disadvantages compared to approaching new persons 
with heuristically tried-and-true interpersonal strategies (e.g., Eaton & Funder, 2003; 





Disruptions in working memory reasonably underlie cognitive performance 
decrements, especially on complex problem-solving tasks (e.g., intelligence and 
scholastic aptitude examinations), which include WMC tasks. Presumably, executive 
functioning is compromised during an examination when anxiety restricts the breadth of 
possible problem solutions in working memory. At the same time, the brain favors 
intuitive over rational solutions (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), which is problematic if the 
person is not well initiated with the examination content (e.g., completing novel 
puzzles). Moreover, if worries pervade cognition, they compete for attention that would 
be better spent on the task at hand (i.e., serve as distractors). Worry commonly is 
described as a major component in anxiety’s role in poor cognitive performance, 
however, as noted by M. Eysenck, Darakshan, Santos, and Calvo (2007), “Worry is 
seldom manipulated explicitly, it is often assessed only retrospectively, and the 
relationship between worry and attention has not been investigated systematically. In 
view of these limitations, relatively little research on worry, anxiety, and performance 
has provided a direct test of the theory (pp. 338).” In agreement, worries are believed to 
have minimal effect on cognitive-task performance in the current designs.  An excited 
and equally unprepared person should show similarly poor performance on complex 
cognitive tasks (e.g., WMC tasks), because working memory in both cases 
systematically restricts in accordance with the current action-oriented motivational 
state.    
The “localizing” of WMC seems consistent with the view that high-arousal 
emotions produce cognitive restrictions, while mostly untouched is the intriguing 





conditions for executive functioning in working memory. This essentially constrains 
Fredrickson’s (2001) broaden-and-build hypothesis to low-arousal positive states, but 
also expands her hypothesis to include low-arousal negative emotions that provide 
similar cognitive-broadening effects, in a manner consistent with Harmon-Jones et al. 
(2013). Namely, calm and sadness are predicted to produce high WMC scores when 
experienced as low motivationally intense states (promotes deliberation over action), 
whereas anxiety and excitement are predicted to produce low WMC when experienced 
with high motivational intensity (promotes action over deliberation).  
 In order for individuals to show cognitive narrowing or broadening effects for 
different emotions, they must experience the appropriate emotional state (e.g., mood) to 
a sufficient level, which is proposed to be largely a matter of temperament. Hence, the 
extent to which an individual shows cognitive narrowing (broadening) to anxious (sad) 
and excited (calm) states is dependent on the person’s general tendencies to be sensitive 
to, and motivated by, those states. Because some individuals may be sensitive to a host 
of valenced states (e.g., anxiety and sadness), then it is possible that a single 
emotionality variable (e.g., negative emotionality) may be predictive of conditions in 
which WMC is low (during anxiety) and high (during sadness), supporting a flexible-
cognition hypothesis. 
Emotionality and Temperament 
 The term emotionality is used to refer to the integration of feeling (affect) with 
thinking (cognition) in the conscious self, which not only includes the affective qualities 
of emotional states and awareness thereof, but also the role affect plays in what and how 





judgments (Brown, 1993; Ditzfeld & Showers, 2013a; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and cognitive processing more broadly (Bower, 1981; Bower 
& Forgas, 2000; Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 1999). Furthermore, 
emotionality is key in shaping individual differences in personality, which are assumed 
to vary due to biological factors (e.g., H. Eysenck, 1967; J. A. Gray & McNaughton, 
2000) and set the stage for shaping the self developmentally through interactions with 
the environment epigenetically.  
 Temperaments are inborn genetic differences that predispose individuals to 
feeling particular affect states, or clusters of states, more or less frequently and/or 
intensely (e.g., Larsen & Diener, 1987). In the current view, emotionality comes pre-
coded from birth, which plays an important role in the heritability of personality in 
humans (Jang, Livesley, & Vermon, 1996; Stein, Jang, Livesley, 2002) and other 
animals (Gosling, 2001; Weiss, King, & Figuerdo, 2000), as well as shaping regulatory 
and motivational styles (Rothbart, 2011; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). For instance, 
Kagan (2010) notes that a number of infants (about 20% in the U.S.) display emotional 
traits of high-reactance (e.g., nervous, shy), complete with discrete physiological 
markers (e.g., greater activation in subcortical region of the brain, viz., amygdalae).  
Importantly, reactance generally extends into at least adolescence (Schwartz, Snidman, 
& Kagan, 1999), suggesting that emotionality is an enduring trait. Similar rates of high-
reactance are shown in other animals as well; such as monkey, rats, and dogs (e.g., 
Kagan, Reznick, & Snidman, 1988). Hence, signs of emotionality exist prior to the 
development of cognitive faculties needed to regulate emotions, and also in animals 





temperament does not preclude a person from expressing a personality inconsistent with 
their basic emotionality at the phenotypic level. For example, social anxiety may be 
mitigated through socialization (Kagan, 2010). However, non-human primate research 
suggests that these cases are due to situation factors (e.g., habituation) rather than 
physiologically eliminating or changing the baseline reactance level (Suomi, 1997).  
Nevertheless, traits generally endure because emotionality influences behavior 
and therefore signs of temperament persist into adulthood. For example, neuroticism 
promotes neurotic behavior from an early age (e.g., social anxiety drives avoidance of 
social situations, eliminating the possibility of mitigating threat through habituation) 
and heredity influences nurturing (e.g., neurotic parents promote anxious-behavioral 
tendencies in their reactive children). This is a passive interaction between genes and 
environment (cf. Plomin, DeFries & Loehlin, 1977). Temperament-based traits are 
promoted through genetic variability, with variability existing because all types of 
emotionalities (even those considered less desirable) provide evolutionary advantages in 
some contexts, even if they are disadvantageous in others. For instance, large and ornate 
peacock feathers confer reproductive advantages and therefore persist despite those 
features increasing the animal’s vulnerability to predation (Petrie, Halliday, & Sanders, 
1991). For example, in terms of emotionality, one advantage of neuroticism is that 
chronic anxieties and worries can initiate actions that successfully serve avoidance 
goals; therefore, anxiety motivates preparatory actions, even though these feelings may 
disrupt performance in high-pressure situations. The current studies explore the 







The first assumption is that some people are more “emotional” than others, 
resulting in greater sensitivity to emotional states that initiate cognitive 
broadening/narrowing processes. Emotional people differentiate themselves based on 
their dispositions toward positive and negative affect states as well as their cognitive 
associates (e.g., self-beliefs). For example, individuals with negative emotionality 
frequently may experience a host of negative feelings (e.g., anxiety and sadness), which 
then activate (or are activated by) negative thoughts (e.g., worry and self-doubt) that 
contribute to relatively negative global self-views, such as low self-esteem and low self-
determination (e.g., depression). The first issue is whether negative and positive 
emotionality runs on a continuum in which emotional individuals tend to experience 
exclusively a host of positive or negative emotions (e.g., predisposed vacillations in 
anxiety and depression; e.g. negative affectivity; Watson & Clark, 1984), or whether 
emotionality variables are best represented as separate factors (e.g., approach and 
avoidance orientation; Elliot & Thrash, 2002; J. A. Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Carver 
& White, 1994). 
Negative emotionality. Research on avoidance-orientation, extending largely 
from J. A. Gray’s (1981, 1991) reinforcement sensitivity theory, suggests that negative-
emotionality individuals respond with more anxiety or stress when confronted with 
obstacles that potentially stand in the way of goals. In other words, avoidance-orientated 
individuals are highly sensitive to threat. However, bred from avoidance research is the 
common misconception of a simple cognitive-affective model that explains avoidance-





subsequently lead to goal abandonment or self-handicapping; a stress-as-debilitating 
model (cf. Crum, Salovey, & Anchor, 2013). However, this is a more simplified model 
than the one J. A. Gray finally articulated (J. A. Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Namely, 
anxiety does not always lead to goal abandonment or failure. Humans (and other 
animals) often use anxiety to motivate behaviors set toward successful goal acquisition. 
For example, common among humans is the habit of working harder around a deadline, 
when stress prioritizes the immediacy of behaviors necessary for goal acquisition. This 
procrastination habit generally is considered a less-than-ideal strategy (Ferrari & Tice, 
2000) that extends from poor self-control (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). Interestingly, 
many of those not inflicted by the habit of procrastination reasonably are those whose 
anxieties kick in before potential failure becomes imminent; namely, individuals for 
whom anxiety and worry are chronic but successfully promote actions to avoid failure 
(e.g., high-functioning neuroticism).  
The rationale in averaging emotionality to include a number of traits that are 
often dissociated (e.g., trait anxiety and depression) extends from the potentially 
important interactive roles of anxiety and sadness in negative emotionality (e.g., Clark, 
Beck, & Stewart, 1990). Anxiety is driven by the threat of potential failure, and failure 
is accompanied by the feeling of sadness. Hence, anxiety serves as the mechanism 
through which individuals avoid sadness. Note that for this to be a successful process, 
an individual must have the requisite belief that failure is avoidable. Individuals who 
come to believe otherwise become “debilitated” by learned helplessness and an external 





The current study samples consist of college students who are not clinically 
depressed or anxious, but rather are relatively high-functioning young adults. There is 
little reason to describe college students as experiencing dysfunctional or debilitating 
levels of negative emotion. In fact, some of these individuals’ successes may be due in 
large part to their anxieties instead of in spite of them. Elliot and Thrash (2002) describe 
individuals with avoidance temperaments as motivated primarily by performance-
avoidance goals (driven by concerns over appearing incompetent). While Elliot and 
colleagues describe avoidance-motivation as undesirable (Roskes, Elliot, & De Dreu, 
2014), they also show that avoidance goals can promote high levels of success (Elliot & 
Harackiewicz, 1996). In these folks, the potential to underperform relative to their peers 
motivates actions to avoid such outcomes. Their cognitive abilities may offer them the 
foresight to see a number of potential threats to success (i.e., they see what might go 
wrong), which activates anxieties that can lead to behaviors set to avoid those negative 
outcomes, such as in perfectionism (Hewitt & Flett, 1991) and defensive pessimism 
(Norem, 2001; Showers & Ruben, 1990).  
Interestingly, low-threat conditions may provide optimal conditions for 
deliberating on the potential actions necessary to meet avoidance goals, which then 
serves to up-regulate anxieties that potentiate behavioral action once a plan is initiated. 
Hence, one possibility is that negative emotionality is associated with relatively high 
overall executive functioning abilities, which individuals use to up-regulate anxieties 
that systematically narrow cognition (restrict WMC) in the service of goal-focus. 
Consistent with this notion, general anxiety disorder was shown to be positively 





2012). Moreover, people high in avoidance-orientation may outperform others on tasks 
because their worries lead to higher and more sustained effort, at least to the extent that 
their anxieties do not compromise performance. Reasonably, the “neurotic” participant 
works hard on tasks because they are concerned about the outcomes of poor 
performance (e.g., evaluation anxiety), thereby providing their own incentives for self-
control across study tasks.  
Positive emotionality. Positive emotionality describes individuals with 
generally positive affectivity and positive engagement with life (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; 
Watson, 2002).  These individuals are driven by the possibility of reward (e.g., 
excitement), which promotes the positive feelings that arise from progress toward goal 
acquisition (e.g., “flow”; Nkamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002); they appreciate the 
feelings of accomplishment they experience following successes (e.g., satisfaction). 
Individuals high in positive emotionality may not be naturally happier, but their drives 
successfully lead to outcomes that earn rewards (e.g., respect and high self-esteem). For 
example, individuals high in extraversion are not dispositionally happy, rather they are 
motivated to seek positive stimulation (Smillie, Cooper, Wilt, & Revelle, 2011), 
generally through meeting and being accepted by new people, which leads to higher 
well-being. The more successful individuals are socially, the more their everyday lives 
tend to be filled with positive feelings because their basic belongingness needs are met 
(Maslow, 1954), which usually translates into higher levels of self-esteem (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000).  
 Social status and happiness are highly coveted traits, especially in individualistic 





cause and consequence of successful goal achievement. Western cultural norms support 
the belief that people are supposed to be happy and enjoy what they do (e.g., Mauss, 
Tamir, Anderson, & Savino, 2011). Positive-emotionality fits the mold. However, even 
positive emotions have a darker side when not experienced in moderation (e.g., Gruber, 
Mauss, & Tamir, 2011). Positive emotionality is related to impulsivity, especially in 
regard to seeking immediately gratifying rewards from social situations (Hirsh, 
Guindon, Morisano, & Peterson, 2010). Moreover, positive emotionality traits accord 
with narcissistic and antisocial personalities (e.g., Bushman, Baumeister, Thomaes, 
Ryu, Begeer, & West, 2009; Paulhus & Williams, 2002).  Just as too much negative 
emotionality leads to emotional-behavioral dysfunction (e.g., depression or anxiety 
disorders), too much positive emotionality (e.g., overabundance of dopamine) is 
suspected to contribute to mania in bipolar disorder (Gruber, Eidelman, Johnson, Smith, 
& Harvey, 2011) and symptoms of schizophrenia (Davis, Kahn, Ko, & M. Davidson, 
1991). Lastly, individuals placing high value on happiness actually have more difficulty 
achieving happiness (Mauss et al., 2011) and feel lonelier (Mauss, Savino, Anderson, 
Weisbuch, Tamir, & Laudenslager, 2011), which suggests that the desire for positive 
emotionality can have undesirable emotional consequences.  
  One caveat to experiencing the positive emotional “ups” when life is going well 
is the possibility that that same individuals may experience negative emotional “downs” 
when life is turned upside down (e.g., affect intensity; Larsen & Diener, 1987). Namely, 
if individuals with positive emotionality are approach-orientated, then they are 
motivated by positive emotions and positive beliefs. These individuals presumably 





(low avoidance orientation). In fact, some anxiety might produce optimal cognitive 
conditions (e.g., cool under pressure). For example, anxiety might initiate low approach 
orientation, which broadens cognition in order to deliberate on the best course of action. 
Nevertheless, their motivations do not preclude them from failure and sometimes loss is 
unpreventable. Under these conditions, positive-emotionality individuals may take 
failure and loss hard (e.g., Shepperd & McNulty, 2002).  Strong sadness may narrow 
cognition in order to attend to the source, focusing attention on the potential cause of 
their negative outcomes (e.g., fault of the self). Hence, positive-emotionality individuals 
may not be put off by the potential for failure, and often successfully avoid it through 
approach-orientation behaviors, but they may experience extreme feelings of failure or 
loss when their motivational style fails to produce desired outcomes.    
 Summary and predictions. Using traditional personality measures as indices of 
emotionality (“emotional” people), the prediction is that high emotionality extends from 
sensitivities toward positive and negative states at the affective core, which includes, 
but extends past, approach-avoidance orientations. Negative (positive) emotionality is 
defined by its sensitivity to a number of negative (positive) emotional states. In 
negative-emotionality, anxiety is hypothesized to narrow (or localize) cognition, 
producing low WMC scores, whereas sadness is hypothesized to broaden (or globalize) 
cognition, producing high WMC scores. In positive emotionality, excitement is 
hypothesized to narrow (or localize) cognition, producing low WMC scores, whereas 
calm is hypothesized to broaden (or globalize) cognition, producing high WMC scores. 
Moreover, if positive-emotionality is accompanied by a broader emotional repertoire 





states, but in the opposite fashion as do negative-emotional individuals: Anxiety may 
broaden (high WMC) and sadness narrow (low WMC) cognition. Lastly, some 
individuals’ emotionality may be sensitive to a more restricted range of emotional 
sources (e.g., strictly approach- or avoidance-orientated), in which case narrowed 
cognition (low WMC) is predicted only in their dominant motivational state (e.g., low 
WMC in approach or avoidance states). 
Self-Concept Organization 
 The last connection to emotionality in the current research is the role of 
cognitive-affective responses in shaping the self-concept, namely in the expression of 
negative self-beliefs across everyday contexts. Showers’s (1992) model of evaluative 
self-organization highlights two main types of evaluative self-structures: Integration and 
compartmentalization (cf., Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2012).  The evaluative organization 
model treats the self-concept as multifaceted (Markus & Wurf, 1987), consisting of a 
multiple selves (self-aspects). Each self-aspect represents an important self context, 
including roles, domains, and states, among others. For each self-aspect, an individual 
has a number of self-beliefs (self-attributes), which are either positively or negatively 
valenced. Evaluative self-integration refers to individuals whose self-aspects contain a 
combination of both positive and negative self-beliefs throughout their multiple selves. 
Evaluative compartmentalization refers to individuals who segregate their negative 
from positive self-beliefs into separate self-aspects. Examples of these two evaluative 
self-concept organizations are presented in Table 1.  
Evaluative compartmentalization. In compartmentalization, individuals’ self-





example, Tim might view himself positively in his role as a scholarly academic (e.g., 
capable, intelligent, comfortable), but entirely negative (e.g., irritable, insecure, tense) 
following a crushing defeat at his favorite leisure activity, competitive street basketball. 
Accordingly, Tim’s emotionality vacillates according to the contextual qualities of the 
situation, so that he experiences strong positive-to-negative feelings about self, and 
rarely experiences feelings that fall more moderately in between. Compartmentalization 
has been described previously (Ditzfeld & Showers, 2013a) as a possible index of affect 
intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987), because individuals with this structure appear to 
respond more extremely to both positive and negative stimulation.  
Evaluative integration. In integration, self-beliefs are not separated by self-
aspect group. Instead, individuals with this structure have both positive and negative 
self-beliefs in their multiple selves. For example, Alex too might have a scholarly 
academic self-aspect, but sees himself with positive (e.g., capable and intelligent) and 
negative (e.g., indecisive and disorganized) qualities within that domain. The same is 
true of him in his favorite leisure activity, attending Star Wars conventions (e.g., happy 
and friendly, but at times irritable and insecure). Overall, Alex may not experience the 
same extreme “highs” as does Tim when positive beliefs are salient, but he also does 
not experience as extreme “lows” when negative beliefs are salient. Whereas Tim takes 
defeat on the basketball court harshly, Alex mitigates threat more effectively, such as 
when another conference attendee shows up in a more realistic Star Wars costume than 
his own (e.g., focuses on enjoying time with friends).  
 Although the organization of positive and negative self-beliefs is the main 





negative self-beliefs and differential importance of self-aspects, play important roles as 
well. The proportion of negative self-beliefs assesses the overall degree of negative 
content in the self-concept. Differential importance (Pelham & Swann, 1987) is an 
index of the relative importance of people’s positive and negative self-aspects. 
Although an abundance of negative self-beliefs typically is detrimental to well-being, 
the impact of negative self-beliefs on the overall self-concept may be mitigated by 
isolating (“compartmentalizing”) negative beliefs into relatively unimportant self-
aspects. Specifically, individuals with relatively positive self-concepts (high DI or low 
neg) are labeled positively compartmentalized or positively integrative and those with 
relatively negative self-concepts (low DI or high neg) are labeled negatively 
compartmentalized or negatively integrative.  
Origins of Evaluative Self-Organization  
 Motivational origins. Early evaluative organization research focused on how 
individuals cope with negative self-beliefs, which reflected a motivational-origins 
approach (Showers, 1992, 1995). Evaluative organizations may represent distinct 
psychological defenses (e.g., Hart, 2014), such that compartmentalization accords with 
self-enhancement (e.g., focus on positives while dismissing negatives) and integration 
accords with a kind of rationalization (e.g., minimizes short-comings by weighing them 
against strengths). In this view, evaluative organizations reflect different styles for 
utilizing positive self-characteristics in in the service of emotion regulation.  
 Affective origins. Alternatively, recent research has examined the possibility 
that evaluative self-concept organizations arise from differences in affective reactivity. 





valence-congruent categorization processes (Ditzfeld & Showers, 2011, 2013b, 2014). 
That is, self-contexts evoke strong positive or negative affect, which give rise primarily 
to positive or negative self-beliefs, respectively. Thus, self-beliefs come into cognition 
in a top-down fashion akin to affect-as-information (J. Brown, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 
1983, 2007). Consequently, representation of the self-concept in memory is sorted into 
good-me or bad-me categories (e.g., Sullivan, 1953/2013). By contrast, integrative 
individuals may have muted affective reactions and, therefore, self-beliefs are not 
anchored by a particular valenced state. Evaluative compartmentalization and 
integration, at least in part, may be the product of high or low emotionality, 
respectively.  
A number of findings are consistent with the affective-origins view (Ditzfeld & 
Showers, 2013a), and indicate that compartmentalization is closer conceptually to affect 
intensity than to defensiveness (e.g., Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998). 
Compartmentalized individuals may self-enhance and dismiss negative beliefs “offline” 
(Thomas, Ditzfeld, & Showers, 2013), but they do not appear to do so in the heat of an 
emotional event. In fact, in conditions of self-threat, compartmentalized individuals 
actually appear emotionally responsive (e.g., Canevello  & Crocker, 2010). For 
instance, Zeigler-Hill and Showers (2007) showed that positively compartmentalized 
individuals’ self-esteem lowered dramatically following social rejection, which is in 
direct contrast to the compensatory self-esteem reactions expected from defensiveness 
(Tesser, 2000). These authors also found in a diary study that compartmentalized 
individuals’ mood fluctuated in accordance with positive and negative daily events. 





associated with high contingencies of self-worth and inauthentic self-aspects (Showers, 
Ditzfeld, & Zeigler-Hill, 2014). Taken together, compartmentalized individuals seem to 
recognize their needs (e.g., belongingness), adjust socially to meet those needs, and 
assume personal responsibility when their needs are not satisfied (i.e., feel the affective 
brunt of failure). Compartmentalized individuals may be apt to listen to their affect 
(e.g., C. Brown & McConnell, 2009), largely because their affect is difficult to ignore.   
Compartmentalization Process: Affective Reactivity Hypothesis 
 An alternative model wherein evaluative organizations are rearticulated as 
categorization “styles” that arise from cognitive-affective processes is tested in the 
current research. In this model, a compartmentalization process is triggered by strong 
affective reactions to emotional contexts, which simultaneously initiates emotion-
categorization and self-categorization, and restricts working memory processes. Hence, 
emotion categorization implicates the self, which gives affect states personal meaning. 
As with emotion categorization, self-categorization comes into focus particularly during 
high-arousal affect states (Barrett, 2011). Valence of the high-arousal state serves as a 
cue that makes accessible primarily positive or negative self-beliefs from secondary 
memory (e.g., Unsworth & Engle, 2007), particularly when situations call for self-
evaluation. Same-valence self-beliefs are brought to attention while, at the same time, 
opposite-valence self-beliefs are restricted from access (e.g., opponent processing). 
Thus, the compartmentalization process makes self-evaluation within a domain 
unambiguously positive or negative. By contrast, muted affective reactivity predisposes 
individuals to low-arousal affect “home bases” (e.g., Kuppens, Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 





beliefs and, therefore, promotes access to a mixture of valenced self-beliefs in an 
“integrative” fashion. 
  Compartmentalization is postulated to be associated with the following 
characteristics: (1) a core affective system prone to high-arousal affect; (2) use of 
emotional valence as a basis for categorization; and (3) restrictions in WMC under 
conditions of high-arousal affect. Evidence for the first two conditions was established 
in previous research and the third is a basis for the current studies.  
Previous support. First, compartmentalized (integrative) individuals report 
typically experiencing high-arousal (low-arousal) affect and report preferences for high-
arousal (low-arousal) positive states (Ditzfeld & Showers, 2014). Second, Ditzfeld and 
Showers (2011, 2013b) showed that compartmentalized individuals more readily 
categorize stimuli based on shared emotional features (emotional response 
categorization; Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 1999). For example, 
compartmentalized individuals are more likely than integratives to associate puppy 
(target word) with parade (happy link) than with beetle (semantic link). Importantly, 
emotion-based categorization appears contingent on emotional reactions, not simply 
“cold” cognitive activation (cf. Innes-Ker & Niedenthal, 2002). Indeed, although 
compartmentalization was associated with emotion-based categorization for sad 
concepts regardless of mood (perhaps demonstrating an acute sensitivity to sadness), 
both happy and fear concept-categorizations were moderated by life stress (Ditzfeld & 
Showers, 2011). Stress decreased the number of happy-based connections while 





individuals experience and prefer high-arousal affect states as well as respond to 
emotional qualities of stimuli, which they use as a basis for categorization.    
Current focus and predictions. The present designs set out to complete the 
puzzle by examining the relationship between evaluative self-organizations and WMC. 
The prediction is that compartmentalization will be associated with low WMC in high-
arousal moods, specifically in conditions of excitement and sadness (similar to positive 
emotionality). Although sadness generally does not fall discretely into a high-arousal 
category in circumplex representation of affect states (Russell & Barrett, 1999), 
compartmentalized individuals appear particularly sensitive to sadness (Ditzfeld & 
Showers, 2011; Showers & Kling, 1996). After all, at the root of compartmentalization 
is self-evaluation, which largely is a gauge of current self-standing (e.g., Srivastava & 
Beer, 2005). Evaluative organization taps primarily into the assessment of selves in 
personally meaningful contexts (current roles, domains, etc.). Temporal selves (e.g., 
future/possible selves) represent only a small proportion (~5%) of participants’ reported 
self-aspects (cf. McConnell, 2011), thus self-organization measures do not capture 
qualities related to approach- or avoidance-orientation. Compartmentalized individuals 
report high satisfaction or high dissatisfaction with current selves, but it is unclear 
whether they are anxious about these or future selves. Indeed, whereas emotionality 
measures are expected to capture affect-mediated motivational factors (i.e., role of 
“black box” core affective system on cognitive processing), evaluative self-organization 
is expected to reflect self processes at the conceptual level (e.g., how “self comes to 
mind”; Damasio, 2010). Compartmentalized individuals are hypothesized to “lock into” 





states restrict WM processes. Accordingly, compartmentalization is hypothesized to be 
associated with low WMC in excited and sad states.  
Overview of Present Research 
Three studies examined the relationship between executive functioning and 
individual differences in emotionality. Study 1 examined the relationship between 
emotionality variables and baseline WMC; namely, it tested the hypothesis that negative 
emotionality is associated with higher WMC (e.g., over-controlled cognition). Study 2 
tested whether indices of negative emotionality (viz., avoidance-orientation) were 
associated with low WMC in an anxious (but not calm) mood condition. Study 3 (focal 
study) examined the relationship among emotionality variables and WMC across a 
number of emotional contexts (mood conditions). A major methodological focus was  
on the mood-induction procedure, which allowed individuals to up-regulate mood 
idiosyncratically through reliving personally-relevant emotional experiences. Mood 
inductions set out to produce emotional states varying in motivational quality and 
generally adhere to a two-dimensional valence-arousal circumplex model of affect 
(Russell & Barrett, 1999): nervous (high avoidance; high-arousal negative), excited 
(high approach; high-arousal positive), calm (low approach; low-arousal positive), and 
sad (low approach; low-arousal negative). Most notably, negative emotionality was 
predicted to be associated with low WMC in the anxious condition but high WMC in 
the sad condition. Positive emotionality was predicted to be associated with low WMC 
in the excited condition and high WMC in the calm condition; as well as potentially 





possible connection between emotionality and WMC variability with self-concept 
structure was examined, exploring the roles of these factors in shaping the self. 
STUDY 1 
  The first study examines bivariate correlations between WMC and emotionality 
measures in order to establish baseline relationships prior to introducing mood into the 
design. Negative emotionally, to some degree, may extend from over-controlled 
cognition. This is consistent with clinical data showing that generalized anxiety is 
associated with high intelligence (Coplan et al., 2006) and, more broadly, the positive 
relationship between stress regulation and brain development in social-cognitive 
evolution (Sapolsky, 2004). Accordingly, negative emotionality (e.g., avoidance-
orientation, neuroticism) was hypothesized to be associated with relatively high 
baseline WMC.  
 Note, negative emotion and executive functioning typically are construed as 
negatively related (e.g., Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008). For example, McRea 
and colleagues (2012) show that emotion-reappraisal ability is negatively associated 
with WMC. However, this position assumes that negative emotions are unwanted and 
therefore the product of dysregulation. By contrast, the current approach favors an 
instrumental account of negative emotion wherein people sometimes choose to up-
regulate negative emotions to accomplish intrapersonal and interpersonal goals (cf. 
Tamir, 2009). Lastly, up-regulation of negative emotion implicates the same brain 
regions (prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex) deemed responsible for down-
regulating negative emotion (Ochsner, Ray, Cooper, Robertson, Chopra, Gabrieli, & 





emotion, particularly in individuals motivated by negative emotions and therefore not 
inclined to down-regulate them.  
Method 
Participants  
 Sixty-two students (38 female; Mage = 19.16) from the University of Oklahoma 
participated voluntarily for course credit. Ethnic/racial composition was 69% White, 
11% Black, 11% Asian, 5% Native American, 2% Hispanic, and 2% other.  
Measures and Tasks 
Working Memory Capacity (WMC)  
Unsworth et al.’s (2005) Automated Operation Span (AOSPAN) Task was used 
to measure WMC. Participants’ goal in the AOSPAN is to maintain attention to a 
variable number of to-be-remember letter sets while simultaneously solving math 
problems correctly. On each trial, a single letter is flashed on the screen for 800 msec. 
Then a two-operation math problem (e.g., 12 – 4 = 7?) is displayed on screen along with 
the option of selecting whether the statement is “true” or “false” using the mouse 
cursor. Following the answer, the next to-be-remembered letter is displayed, followed 
by another math problem, and so on. Trials contain 3-to-7 to-be-remembered letters, 
with longer sets requiring greater WMC to remember successfully. At the end of each 
set, a 4 x 3 letter matrix is presented on screen, with which participants are to select the 
correct letters in the same order as presented. Each participant receives the same letters-
operations sets, but sets are presented in random order. AOSPAN scores are the sum of 
the total number of letters from perfectly recalled sets across all trials. Scores range 





 Practice trials were completed at the beginning of the session. Within practice 
trials answer duration for math operations performed outside of the memory task were 
recorded by the computer as a measure of each person’s baseline speed. If the 
computation duration extended beyond 2.5 sec SDs above baseline later in the 
experimental trials, the program automatically moved forward and recorded a math 
error. Maintaining 85% overall math accuracy was required throughout experimental 
trials. 
Questionnaires 
Affect Valuation Index (AVI): Trait and state affect. Tsai’s (2007) AVI 
includes 24 affect states that vary in valence and arousal quality in order to represent 
octants of the affect circumplex (see Figure 1; cf. Russell & Barrett, 1999). Participants 
indicated the degree to which they experience each affect state on a scale from 1 (very 
slightly) to 5 (very much). At different stages of the study participants used the AVI 
items to report trait affect (“report how you feel typically”) and state affect (“report how 
you feel right now”). Affect scores were calculated by averaging ratings for positive 
states and negative states separately (cf. PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
Beck’s Depression Inventory II (BDI-II). The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) is a questionnaire containing 21 depressive symptoms (e.g., sadness) that 
individuals rate according to experienced severity over the past two weeks (e.g., 1 = I 
do not feel sad; 2 = I feel sad much of the time; 3 = I am sad all the time; 4 = I am so 
sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it). Responses were summed and then squared in 





sample having relatively low scores on the scale. High scores indicate relatively high 
levels of non-clinical depression.  
Behavioral Inhibition/Activation Systems (BIS/BAS). The BIS/BAS (Carver 
& White, 1994) is a 24-item questionnaire that includes one subscale for Behavioral 
Inhibition (e.g., “I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry 
at me”) and three subscales for Behavioral Activation, including Drive (e.g., “When I 
want something I usually go all-out to get it”), Fun Seeking (e.g., “I'm always willing to 
try something new if I think it will be fun”), and Reward Responsiveness (e.g., “When I 
get something I want, I feel excited and energized”). Participants rate agreement with 
each statement on a 1 (very true for me) to 4 (very false of me) scale. Each subscale was 
calculated such that high values indicate high levels of that trait. 
Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI).  The EPI (H. Eysenck & S. Eysenck, 
1964) is a 57-item questionnaire that includes items for Neuroticism (e.g., “Do you 
often worry about things you should not have done or said?”) and Extraversion (e.g., 
“Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself a lot at a party?”). Participants 
determine if the statements are characteristic of themselves by indicating “yes” or “no” 
to each item. High scores reflect high levels of neuroticism/extraversion.  
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS). The PSS (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 
1983) measures a person’s level of life stress in the past month. The PSS is a 10-item 
questionnaire (e.g., “In the past month, how often have you felt difficulties were piling 
up so high that you could not overcome them?”) on which participants rate experiencing 






Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES). The RSES (Rosenberg, 1965) measures 
level of perceived self-worth using a 10-item questionnaire (e.g., “On the whole, I am 
satisfied with myself”), on which participates rate agreement from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree). High scores indicate high trait self-esteem.  
Trait Anxiety Inventory (TAI). The TAI (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) contains 20 statements related to dispositional anxiety (e.g., “I 
worry too much over some things that really don’t matter”) to which participants rate 
experiencing on a scale from 1 (almost always) to 4 (almost never) scale. High scores 
indicate high trait anxiety.  
Self-Descriptive Card Sort  
The card-sort task was developed by Zajonc (1960), utilized for measuring self-
complexity (Linville, 1985, 1987), and then adapted for measuring evaluative self-
concept organization by Showers (1992). In the self-descriptive card-sort task, 
participants are given 40 cards, each with a potentially self-descriptive attribute printed 
on them. One half of the cards display positive attributes (e.g., friendly, organized) and 
the other half displays negative attributes (e.g., insecure, irritable). Participants are 
asked to, “Think of the different aspects of yourself and your life and sort the cards into 
groups where each group describes an aspect of yourself and your life.” Participants are 
to create as many groups as they feel are representative of the self. Because some 
attributes may be descriptive of the self in several (or none) of their groups, participants 
are allowed to re-use an attribute in multiple groups or not use it at all. Table 1 displays 





  Evaluative self-organization (phi). Compartmentalization is an index of the 
organization of positive and negative self-content in the card sort, measured by the phi-
coefficient (ϕ or Cramer’s V; Cramer, 1945/1975; Everitt, 1977). Scores are based on a 
chi-square statistic, such that organizations of positively and negatively valenced 
attributes are compared to the distribution that would be expected by chance. That is, a 
completely “ordered” card sort has positive and negative attributes separated into 
homogeneous groups (perfectly compartmentalized) and a completely “unordered” card 
sort has a mixture of positive and negative attributes evenly distributed across aspects 
(perfectly integrative). Scores range from relatively integrative (phi = 0) to relatively 
compartmentalized (phi = 1.0). See Showers and Kevlyn (1999) for additional details. 
 Differential importance (DI).  Differential importance, adapted from Pelham 
and Swann (1989), is an index of positivity/negativity of a person’s important self-
aspects. Following the card sort, participants report how positive, negative, and 
important they view each self-aspect that they created on a 7-point scale. DI is the 
correlation between positivity (positive minus negative ratings) and importance ratings 
across all self-aspect groups. Scores range from -1 (negative self-aspects rated most 
important) to 1 (positive self-aspects rated most important). 
Self-concept negativity (neg). Neg measures the amount of negative content in 
the self by dividing the number of negative attributes a person uses in the card sort by 
the total number of attributes used.  
Model assumptions: Sample exclusions and moderator variables. The focus in 
the evaluative organization model generally is on how self-organization relates to how 





are excluded when they report especially low negative self-content (fewer than 3 
negative self-beliefs) or fewer than three self-aspect groups (cf. Showers & Kevlyn, 
1999). Analyses for the model examines the moderating effect of DI and neg on 
evaluative self-organization, with these moderators having different effects based on the 
context and sample (Ditzfeld & Showers, 2013a). In the current investigation, DI is the 
cognitive process of weighting positive self-aspects as relatively more or less important 
than negative self-aspects (viz. emotional control). Neg may represent the susceptibility 
of experiencing negative emotional states because greater amounts of negative content 
in important self-aspects generally relates to a greater probability of experiencing 
chronic negative emotion.  
Procedure 
Participants attended a 1.5 hour session in groups of 1-to-5. Upon arrival, 
participants were led to a small hall with cubicles on both sides. Each person was 
directed to an assigned cubicle and listened to initial instructions from an experimenter 
as a group. The session began with (1) the self-descriptive card-sort task. Card-sort 
instructions were read to the group and then participants completed the card sort in their 
private rooms. Once everyone finished, general instructions for the remainder of the 
study were read aloud and cubicle doors were closed for privacy. Thereafter, the study 
was computer automated through Inquisit software. The program led participants 
through tasks in the following order: (2) RSES, (3) trait-affect ratings (AVI typical 
affect), (4) affect evaluation task (not discussed here; cf. Robinson, Storbeck, Meier, & 
Kirkeby, 2004), (5) AOSPAN practice trials, (6) AOSPAN experimental trials, (7) 





elated, happy, calm), (8) affect similarity ratings (cf. Ditzfeld & Showers, 2014), (9) 
BIS/BAS, (10) TAI, (11) EPI, (12) PSS, and (13) BDI-II. Lastly, participants completed 
demographics before being thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.   
Sample. Analyses included the full 62 participant sample, except for correlations 
involving PSS and BDI-II (1 participant failed to complete these scales) and evaluative 
self-organization (4 participants were excluded for values invalid to the model as 
described above).    
Results and Discussion  
 Intercorrelations and descriptive statistics for WMC and emotionality variables 
are presented in Table 2. Two indices of negative emotionality were associated with 
relatively high executive-functioning ability. Behavioral inhibition (BIS) was positively 
associated with WMC (r = .29, p = .021) and neuroticism was somewhat positively 
associated with WMC (r = .21, p = .103). Relatively high cognitive ability may 
contribute to chronic up-relation of anxiety: over-controlled cognition. Alternatively, 
generally anxious individuals may have worked harder on the WMC task due to self-
presentation concerns (e.g., Schlenker & Leary, 1982) or because there was no risk of 
damaging mood from task engagement (cf. hedonic contingency; Wegener & Petty, 
1994).  
 The relationship between WMC and evaluative self-organization was tested 
using hierarchical multiple regression. WMC was set as the criterion and the procedure 
entered compartmentalization (phi), differential importance (DI), and self-concept 
negativity (neg) main effect variables on Step 1 and the three two-way interaction terms 





ps > .220). Evaluative self-organization was not associated with baseline executive 
functioning. This puts doubt to a possible third variable explanation in which the 
affective reactivity predisposing compartmentalized individuals to high-arousal affect 
(Ditzfeld & Showers, 2013a, 2014) extends from baseline inabilities to control 
emotions cognitively (e.g., poor coping skills).  
 State mood was unrelated to WMC, although individuals with high WMC scores 
felt relatively happy (r = .20, p = .201) and calm (r = .19, p = .140) following the 
AOSPAN task. Controlling for these ratings had little influence on the WMC 
correlations with BIS (r[57] = .25, p = .061) and neuroticism (r[57] = .24, p = .067).   
STUDY 2 
The primary goals of Study 2 were to establish the effectiveness of the mood-
induction procedure and provide preliminary tests of the hypothesis that anxiety 
narrows cognition (restricts WMC) in negative-emotionality individuals. Although it 
seems axiomatic to say that anxiety disrupts cognitive processing, the anxiety literature 
has produced a rather surprising limited number of circumstances in which anxious 
individuals actually show executive functioning deficits under stress. Using attentional 
control theory (ACT), M. W. Eysenck and colleagues (2007) suggest that trait-anxious 
individuals do not show performance deficits on tasks like the AOSPAN because this 
task requires central-executive updating. All components of the AOSPAN task are 
relevant to success (a person must correctly remember letters and correctly solve math 
problems) and anxious individuals evidentially are most sensitive to task-irrelevant 
distracters, namely threatening stimuli. By contrast, high-anxious individuals struggle in 





(Santos & M. W. Eysenck, 2005) showing that even adding ongoing performance 
feedback by an experimenter did not produce discernably low WMC scores in high-
anxious individuals (cf. non-automated OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1987). ACT proposes 
that high-anxious individuals cognitively are effective but rather inefficient.  Thus, high-
anxious individuals’ comparable performance to low-anxious individuals is theorized to 
be due to especially high cognitive effort, which makes up for inefficiencies. Anxious 
individuals simply mentally work harder. The ACT cognitive-inefficiency hypothesis is 
supported by neurological studies showing that high-anxious individuals have greater 
activation in brain regions related to cognitive effort while performing WMC tasks (J. 
R. Gray & Braver, 2002; J. R. Gray, Burgess, Schaefer, Yarkonki, Larsen, & Braver, 
2005). Along these lines, the relatively high WMC scores achieved by negative-
emotionality individuals in Study 1 perhaps was due to high levels of cognitive effort, 
and this was possible because the AOSPAN task alone did not produce disruptive levels 
of anxiety.  
Previous failures to show WMC restrictions on updating tasks such as the 
AOSPAN by high trait-anxious individuals possibly extends from typical mood 
manipulations not providing the appropriate affective context for WMC restrictions. For 
example, evaluation anxiety and scary film clips evoke anxiety broadly and perhaps are 
ineffective in producing the kinds of emotional experiences common to, and 
characteristic of, negative-emotionality individuals. For instance, a researcher studying 
phobias presumably would not use a single stimulus (e.g., pictures of dogs) for a sample 
that included a broad range of phobias (e.g., fear of dogs, spiders, social situation, etc.).  





idiosyncratically with the emotionality of an individual. To do so, participants mentally 
and emotionally relived their own past emotional experience, an anxious or calm event, 
under the backdrop of classical music. This procedure was validated previously to 
produce appropriate mood states and influence attentional processing (cf. Jefferies, 
Smilek, Eich, & Enns, 2008).  
In Study 2 participants were induced into an anxious or calm mood prior to 
completing the experimental trials of the WMC task (AOSPAN). As a preliminary 
study, negative-emotionality variables were restricted to trait anxiety (TAI) and 
behavioral inhibition (BIS). Positive-emotionality variables were restricted to the 
behavioral approach system (BAS) subscales. These variables were selected because 
they are the commonly used in cognitive-affective studies of this nature (e.g., M. W. 
Eysenck et al., 2007; J. R. Gray et al, 2005). Negative emotionality was hypothesized to 




 Forty-seven students (40 female; Mage = 19.21) at the University of Oklahoma 
participated voluntarily for course credit. Ethnicity/race was 70% White, 11% Black, 









Mood Conditions: Reliving Emotional Events  
Mood-induction. Mood states were induced using procedures from Jefferies et 
al. (2008). Participants were asked to re-experience a time in their lives when they felt 
anxious or calm by mentally reliving a life event for 5 min. Before beginning the mood-
induction trial, participants read a cover story informing them that most people can 
intensify, lessen, and end their mood states. In addition, they were informed that they 
would be listening to classical music pieces shown previously to help place people into 
anxious mood (Uranus the Magician by Karajan) or calm mood (Venus, the Bringer of 
Peace by Karajan and Carnival of the Animals: The Swan by Saint- Saenss). 
Participants were ensured they would be returned to a generally positive mood at the 
conclusion of the study.  
After reading instructions, participants placed on headphones and recorded the 
event they planned to relive in a textbox embedded in the computer program. After 
pressing “OK” to indicate readiness, the computer program moved to the mood-
induction stage. At that point, the program initiated playing the classical music piece. 
Participants viewed a gray screen that displayed text reminding them which mood to 
relive and a time-bar that gradually filled across 5 min. With 30 sec remaining, 
participants were alerted that the next task was about to start and instructed to carry 
their mood into that task. The music discontinued playing at the end of the trial.  
Mood check and reinstatement. Following the initial mood-induction stage, 
participants reported current mood level in regard to valence (positive, negative), 
arousal (energized, intense), and condition mood (anxiety or calm) on 1 (not much) to 7 





entered the same mood as before by re-living the calm or anxious event again for an 
additional 3 minutes. As before, with 30 sec remaining participants were alerted that the 
next task was about to start and instructed to carry their mood into that task. Participants 
then moved directly into the experimental trials of the AOSPAN.  
Mood recovery. At the conclusion of the study, all participants went through a 
3 min calm-mood induction (same procedures as above), which included the classical 
music piece Rodeo: No. 2 Corral Nocturne by Copeland. 
Procedure 
 Sessions were run in groups of 1-to-5 participants. Upon arrival, participants 
were led to a small hall with cubicles on both sides. Each person was directed to an 
assigned cubicle and listened to instructions from an experimenter as a group. 
Following general instructions, cubicle doors were closed for privacy. Thereafter, the 
study was computer automated though Inquisit software. The program included the 
following tasks and progressed in the order as listed: (1) WMC task (AOSPAN) 
practice trials, (2) affect evaluation task (not discussed), (3) mood induction (randomly 
assigned to anxious or calm condition; 5 min), (4) mood check and mood reinstatement 
(3 min), (5) WMC task (AOSPAN) experimental trials, (6) state-mood ratings (AVI 
items), (7) BIS/BAS, (8) TAI, (9) demographics, and (10) concluded with the mood-
recovery session (3 min calm-mood induction). Once finished, participants were 









 Mood-check ratings. Individuals in the anxious condition reported feeling more 
negative (Manx = 4.52, Mcalm = 1.75; t[45]  = -7.03, p < .001, d = -2.05), less positive 
(Manx = 3.35, Mcalm = 5.75; t = 5.65, p < .001, d = 1.65) and marginally more intense 
(Manx = 4.78, Mcalm = 4.00; t = -1.86, p = .070, d = -.54) than did those in the calm 
condition. Both groups felt equally energized (Manx = 4.00, Mcalm = 3.96, t = .08, p = 
.934, d = .02).  
In addition, a mood-level variable was calculated by creating an index of 
condition-mood ratings; that is, participants’ anxiety or calm rating for respective mood 
conditions. Not surprisingly, individuals reported more fully recreating feelings of calm 
(M = 5.79, SD = 1.02) than anxiety (M = 5.00, SD = 1.17), t(45) = 2.38, p = .017, d = 
.70.  
WMC. Mood condition had no direct effect on WMC scores, which were nearly 
identical in anxious (M = 42.96, SD = 14.89) and calm (M = 43.79, SD = 13.75) 
conditions, t(45) = .20, p = .835, d = .06. Thus, any predictable variability in WMC 
scores based on mood condition required a moderator variable. 
Self-Reported Mood and WMC 
Pre-WMC-task mood. The next analytic step involved testing whether self-
reported mood during the manipulation check (pre-AOSPAN) was predictive of WMC 
scores. Mood-level rating was not associated with WMC scores in the anxious (r = .22, 
p = .308) or calm condition (r = -.08, p = .697). The only significant WMC predictors 





.61, p = .002) and intense (r = .42, p = .046) prior to the task. This suggests an 
important role of mood framing in WMC-task performance. 
Post-WMC-task mood (state affect). High WMC scores were associated 
greater positive affect in the anxious condition (r = .43, p = .040) and somewhat greater 
positive affect in the calm condition (r = .29, p = .175). Negative affect ratings were not 
associated with WMC in the anxious (r = -.02, p = .939) or calm condition (r = .09, p = 
.680). Follow-up analyses tested the possible interaction between mood condition and 
state-affect ratings using hierarchical multiple regression. Positive and negative affect in 
tested as moderators in separate analyses. The only significant finding was a main effect 
of positive affect (β = .37, p = .012). Top WMC-task performers felt more positive 
following the AOSPAN, irrespective of mood condition, and despite not receiving any 
objective performance feedback.  
Emotionality and WMC 
Negative emotionality. Bivariate correlations between emotionality variables 
and WMC were calculated for anxious and calm conditions separately (Table 3). 
Despite a significant positive relationship between trait anxiety and behavior inhibition 
(r = .44, p = .002), these two measures diverged in predicting WMC, particularly in the 
anxious condition. Consistent with predictions, trait anxiety was negatively associated 
with WMC in the anxious condition (r = -.40, p = .057), but not in the calm condition (r 
= .04, p = .852). A follow-up hierarchical multiple regression analysis tested main 
effects for trait anxiety and mood condition, along with the interaction term. The 
interaction was non-significant (β = -.21, p = .162), which indicates that trait-anxious 





those in the anxious condition. Behavioral inhibition (BIS) was not associated with 
WMC in the anxious condition (r = .17, p = .427) or calm condition (r = .04, p = .850). 
A follow-up regression analysis produced no main effects or an interaction involving 
BIS. 
Positive emotionality. The three behavioral activation subscales were unrelated 
to WMC in the anxious (rs > .19, ps > .200) and calm (|r|s ≤ .08, ps > .720) conditions. 
For consistency with previous research, a BASg score was calculated by standardizing 
and averaging scores on the three BAS subscales (cf. J. R. Gray & Braver, 2002). BASg 
did not produce a significant correlation with WMC in the anxious (r = .29, p = .181) or 
calm (r = -.02, p = .933) condition. Follow-up multiple regression analyses provided no 
significant main effects or interactions involving BASg or any of the BAS subscales.  
The last set of analyses examined whether the relationship between trait anxiety 
and WMC in the anxious condition could be explained by differences in self-reported 
mood. Using a multiple regression procedure, the variables of trait anxiety, pre-WMC-
task energized, pre-WMC-task intense, and post-WMC-task positive affect were entered 
as simultaneous predictors of WMC. The only unique predictor was energized ratings (β 
= .48, p = .049). Trait anxiety (β = -.24, p = .243), intense ratings (β = .12, p = .551), 
and positive affect (β = .04, p = .882) all failed to explain unique variance. 
Nevertheless, a follow-up mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) indicated that the 
correlation between trait anxiety and WMC in the anxious condition was not fully or 
partially mediated by self-reported energized feelings (95% CI for indirect effect: -







 Study 2 provided evidence that the mood-induction procedure was effective not 
only in establishing anxious- and calm-mood states, but also in influencing WMC.  
Specifically, high trait-anxious individuals performed more poorly in an anxious-mood 
condition than did low trait-anxious individuals. This finding should not be understated, 
as previous research generally fails to show WMC restrictions in trait-anxious 
individuals on cognitive updating tasks (e.g., M. W. Eysenck, 2007). The current 
findings presumably diverge from previous research because the mood-induction 
procedure allowed anxious individuals to reflect on a personally relevant emotional 
event and this established an appropriate affective context for up-regulating their 
personal brand of anxiety.  
Despite high-anxious individuals relatively low WMC scores in the anxious 
condition, trait anxiety and self-reported anxiety were unrelated (r = -.25, p = .249). 
Thus, high-anxious individuals did not set themselves up for poor performance by 
claiming extreme levels of anxiety prior to completing the WMC task. The possibility 
that the anxious-mood induction produced worries that distracted high-anxious 
individuals cannot be ruled out; however, for a number of reasons, this explanation 
seem unlikely. One, WMC task itself offers a built-in opportunity to distract people 
from worries (e.g., Showers & Kling, 1996). Two, past negative emotional events lose 
intensity over time (Walker & Skowronski, 2009) and become relatively  “closed” 
psychologically (e.g., Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005). Hence, past worries become 





Interestingly, individuals feeling energized by the anxious-mood induction 
performed particularly well on the WMC task. These individuals not only were not put 
off by anxiety, but they actually thrived cognitively in that state. One possibility is that 
these individuals do not conceptualize anxiety as a particularly negative state, and thus 
experience a qualitatively different affect state than other people. Accordingly, two 
small methodological adjustments were made prior to moving into the larger focal 
investigation. First, the word “anxious” was replaced by “nervous” in the mood-
induction procedure to help ensure that individuals up-regulated a high-arousal negative 
states (and not a high-arousal positive stated) in an attempt to decreasing variability that 
may have extended from differences in semantic representations of anxiety (viz., low-
anxious individuals may see anxiety as excitement). Secondly, self-reported mood 
ratings examining the effectiveness of the mood manipulations were moved to end of 
the study session, thus made retrospectively. Making features of people’s moods salient 
through self-report may have provided an artificial means to appraise and regulate mood 
prior to entering the WMC task.     
STUDY 3 
 Study 3 set out to investigate the major themes covered in the general 
introduction, namely testing WMC variability as function of emotionality and mood 
condition. As such, the complete package of tasks and measures were included. Most 
notably, individuals were placed into one of four mood conditions, which varied by 
valence and arousal (sad, nervous, excited, and calm). In addition, also included were 
two questionnaires assessing self-reported regulatory control abilities in emotion 





2004). Study 3 is presented in two analytical phases: Phase 1 establishes the factor 
structure of the emotionality variables and Phase 2 tests the role of emotionality and 
mood on WMC variability. Following description of study methodology, each phase is 
presented with a mini introduction, results, and discussion section.   
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred ninety-five students (162 females; Mage = 18.90) at the University 
of Oklahoma participated voluntarily for course credit in a two-session study. 
Ethnicity/race was 73% White, 8% Asian, 8% Black, 5% Hispanic, 4% Native 
American, and 2% other. 
Measures and Tasks 
Mood Conditions: Reliving Emotional Events  
 Using the mood-induction procedure from Study 2, participants were asked to  
re-live emotionally a time in their lives when they were nervous (Uranus the Magician 
by Karajan), sad (Adagio in G Minor by Albioni), excited (Slavonic Dances by 
Dvorak), or calm (Venus, the Bringer of Peace by Karajan and Carnival of the Animals: 
The Swan by Saint-Saens). The task lasted 5 min. With 30 sec remaining, participants 
were alerted that the next task was about to start and instructed to carry their mood into 
that task. The music discontinued playing at the end of the trial.  
 Retrospective mood ratings. In order to move participants directly into the 
WMC task, and to avoid making the cognitive features of emotions salient before doing 
so (cf. Schwarz & Clore, 2007), mood ratings were made at the end of the focal study 





nervous, sad, calm, and excited they felt when reliving their past mood event on a scale 
from 1(not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Additional Questionnaires 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). The ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) 
measures self-reported strategies that people use to regulate their emotions. The ERQ is 
a 10-item questionnaire that includes subscales for Reappraisal (e.g., “When I want to 
feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation”) and 
Suppression (e.g., “I control my emotions by not expressing them”). Participants rate 
agreement to each item on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale. High 
scores indicate high self-reported reappraisal ability and greater tendency to suppress 
emotions, respectively. 
Self-Control Scale (SCS). The SCS (Tangney et al., 2004) measures self-
reported self-control ability in everyday situations based on a 36-item questionnaire 
(e.g., “I am good at resisting temptation”), on which participants rate agreement to each 
item on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) scale. High scores indicate high self-reported 
trait self-control. 
Procedure 
 After selecting the study via the online departmental experimental registration 
system, participants arrived at the laboratory to participate in a two-session study. The 
second session was scheduled to take place the following week at the same time and in 
the same location. Each session was 1 hr long.  
 Session 1. After arriving at the waiting room, participants were run in groups of 





Each person was directed to an assigned cubicle and listened to instructions from an 
experimenter as a group. Following general instructions, cubicle doors were closed for 
privacy. Thereafter, the study was computer automated by Inquisit software. Tasks and 
questionnaires were administered fully on computers in the following order: (1) 
AOSPAN practice trials, (2) affect evaluation task (not discussed), (3) mood induction 
(5 min; randomly assigned to nervous, sad, excited, or calm condition), (4) AOSPAN 
experimental trials, (5) state affect ratings (current level of select AVI items; elated, 
happy, calm, inactive, sluggish, sad, nervous, aroused), (6) BIS/BAS, (7) TAI, (8) 
demographics, (9) retrospective affect ratings, and (10) affect recovery (3 min calm 
mood induction). Once finished, participants were thanked, reminded to return the 
following week, and dismissed.  
Session 2. Participants returned at the same time one week later. After arriving 
at the waiting room, participants were escorted as a group to a single room that 
contained partition-dividers placed between each person. The session began with the 
experimenter giving instructions for the self-descriptive card-sorting task to the group 
collectively. Participants completed the card-sort by themselves within their partition. 
Once everyone completed card-sorting task, participants were instructed to move onto a 
questionnaire packet containing RSES, AVI, PSS, EPI, SCS, ERQ, and BDI-II, in that 
order.
1
 When finished, participants were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 After recording AVI trait-affect, participants then went back through 24 affect-state items and reported 
much they ideally experience each state (affect valuation; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). Preliminary 
analyses indicate that people generally show preferences for the same states they report experiencing 






The full sample of 195 participants was used for analyses involving 
questionnaire measures. In analyses involving the evaluative self-organization variables, 
the sample was reduced to 182 due to exclusion criteria for the model, which included 
reporting an insufficient number of card-sort groups (3), using fewer than 3 negative 
self-attributes (4), or missing card-sorting task data (6).  
Analytic Phase 1: Emotionality Factors 
 The 15 questionnaire variables and three self-organization measures were 
submitted to a principle components analysis in order to examine the reduced factor 
structure of the emotionality variables. Intercorrelations and descriptive statistics for 
emotionality variables are reported in Table 4. The principle component analysis 
produced five factors with eigenvalues greater than one (Table 5). Factor 1 was labeled 
negative-positive emotionality, as high scores represent generally high levels of 
negative cognitive-affective traits (depression, neuroticism, anxiety, stress, and negative 
affectivity) and low scores represent high levels of positive cognitive-affective traits 
(self-esteem and positive affectivity). Factor 2 was labeled approach orientation 
because it included the three behavioral-approach-system subscales, extraversion, and 
low self-control (e.g., impulsivity). Factor 3 included only the behavioral inhibition 
(BIS) measure and was labeled avoidance orientation. Factor 4 included all three self-
organization measures (compartmentalization, self-concept negativity, and differential 
importance). Factor 5 included the two emotion-regulation variables of reappraisal and 
suppression. New scores were computed for negative-positive emotionality (Factor 1) 





contained within each factor (self-esteem and positive trait affect were reverse-scored 
for the Factor 1 calculation).  
 Preliminary analyses examining the correlations among factors provided a 
number of noteworthy findings. Negative-emotionality was separable from, but 
associated with, avoidance orientation (r = .36, p < .001) and low emotion-reappraisal (r 
= -.32, p < .001). Approach- and avoidance-orientation each were unique factors, which 
suggest that neither motivational orientation leads directly to positive or negative 
emotionality at the trait level. Interestingly, self-control loaded negatively onto the 
approach-orientation factor, indicating that individuals high on this variable (e.g., 
extraverts) are attracted to immediate gratification and are sensation-seekers. 
Nevertheless, approach-orientation was associated with high emotion-reappraisal ability 
(r = .18, p = .010), which indicates that these individuals do report an ability to control 
their emotions (i.e., up-regulate positive feelings and down-regulate negative feelings).  
  To test the possible relationships involving negative-positive emotionality, 
approach orientation, avoidance orientation, emotion suppression, and emotion 
reappraisal with evaluative self-organization, a series of hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses were performed with self-organization variables set as predictor variables. 
Each criterion was entered separately. On Step 1, the main effect variables of 
compartmentalization (phi), negative self-content (neg), and different importance (DI) 
were mean-centered and entered. On Step 2, all two-way interaction terms for those 
variables were entered. On Step 3, the three-way interaction term was entered. The 
analysis on the negative-positive emotionality variable provided a significant main 





(β = -.16, p = .041). As predicted values (cf. Aiken & West, 1991) in Figure 2 illustrate, 
negative integrative self-organization was associated with especially high negative 
emotionality. Compartmentalization was associated with moderate levels of 
emotionality, presumably because both positively and negatively compartmentalized 
individuals are prone to a combination of positive and negative emotions across 
everyday contexts in a fashion akin to affect intensity (Ditzfeld & Showers, 2014). In 
addition, there was main effect of neg for emotion reappraisal ability (β = -.22, p = 
.006). Individuals with high amounts of negative content in their self-concepts fail to 
regulate their emotions through reappraisal.  
Discussion 
 The factor analysis provided five separate factors. Most interestingly, a 
negative-positive emotionality factor emerged that indicates that some individuals 
experience negative feelings and thoughts at the exclusion of positive feelings and 
thoughts (or vice versa) on a single dimension, and this emotionality is to some degree 
separable from approach- and avoidance-orientation. Emotion regulation variables also 
loaded onto their own factor, which suggests that emotionality does not extend entirely 
from control factors: Temperament and cognitive control appear conceptually distinct. 
Note, however, that Gross and John’s (2003) reappraisal measure taps into people’s 
ability to produce positive emotion and minimize negative emotion. It remains unclear 
whether individuals high on the measure are better at controlling their emotions, or if 
some individuals (e.g., high positive emotionality and/or high approach orientation) 





 Lastly, while self-organization variables loaded on their own factor, negative 
evaluative integration was associated with high negative emotionality. This finding 
likely extends from these individuals’ chronic access to negative self-beliefs across a 
number of important self-contexts. This differs from negatively compartmentalized 
individuals who experience positive emotional “ups” from time to time (Ditzfeld & 
Showers, 2013a; Showers, Zeigler-Hill, & Limke, 2006). As such, negatively 
compartmentalized individuals’ instability leads to more moderate scores on trait 
measures of negative emotionality than found with negative integration, wherein 
negative feelings are less intense but rather unrelenting.    
Analytic Phase 2: Role of Emotionality and Mood in Working Memory Capacity 
  The next phase of the analysis examined the effect of mood on working 
memory processing by testing the roles of (1) valence and arousal qualities and (2) 
individual differences in emotionality. As a reminder, mood conditions included four 
different moods, each with unique motivational properties: nervousness (high 
avoidance; high-arousal negative), excitement (high approach; high-arousal positive), 
calm (low approach; low-arousal positive), and sadness (low avoidance/approach; low-
arousal negative).  
 Following the factor analysis, specific predictions were made in regard to the 
emotionality factor variables. Individuals with negative emotionality were hypothesized 
to have relatively low WMC when nervous but high WMC when sad. Individuals with 
positive emotionality (and compartmentalized self-concept organization) were 
hypothesized to have relatively low WMC when excited and high WMC when calm.  





when sad and high WMC when nervous. Approach orientation was predicted to be 
associated with especially low WMC when excited (default motivationally intense state) 
whereas avoidance orientation was predicted to be associated with especially low WMC 
when nervous (default motivationally intense state).  
Emotion reappraisal ability was included as a measure of emotional control in 
order to delineate to what degree WMC in mood states is predicted by indices more 
greatly related to “feeling” (temperament-based emotionality measure), “thinking” 
(control-based regulation measure), or whether these factors interact with each other. 
Also, the emotion reappraisal measure previously was shown to be positively associated 
with baseline working memory ability (McRae et al., 2011), and therefore served as an 
important covariate in the analyses.    
Mood Conditions 
 To test the effectiveness of the mood manipulations, four one-way ANOVAs 
were run on retrospective mood ratings for nervous, sad, excited, and calm items 
(dependent variables) based on condition (independent variable). All four ANOVAs 
were significant, 25.50 < Fs(3, 191) < 52.25, ps < .001, .29 < η
2
 < .47. Participants 
reported experiencing the appropriate mood state to a significantly greater degree than 
did those in the other three conditions; all Bonferroni pair-wise comparisons were 
significant (ps < .001). In addition, a second analysis entered mood level (retrospective 
mood rating for the condition mood; M = 5.17; SD = 1.46) into a 2 (Valence; positive, 
negative) x 2 (Arousal; low, high) ANOVA in order to test whether some condition 
moods were easier to relive than others. This analysis produced main effects of valence, 
F(1, 191) = 4.55, p = .034, η
2 







Individuals reported feeling the condition mood more completely in positive (M = 5.40) 
than in negative (M = 4.96) conditions; and more completely in low-arousal (M = 5.40) 
than in high-arousal (M = 4.95) conditions. Not surprisingly, participants found it easier 
to reproduce moods that were more positive and lower in arousal (consistent with Study 
2).    
 In order to test the effect of mood condition on WMC, AOSPAN scores were 
entered into a 2 (Valence: positive/negative) x 2 (Arousal: low/high) ANOVA.  This 





≤ .003. As in Study 2, any variability in WMC scores across mood conditions 
must extend from individual difference factors (i.e., moderator variables).  
 Moderator-variable analyses begin with self-reported mood because affect 
introspection provides the most direct index of mood experience. Those analyses are 
followed by tests of emotionality-variable moderation. Associations with emotionality 
variables were expected to influence WMC indirectly because individuals are presumed 
to have little insight into the cognitive-affective processes produced by emotional 
context.     
WMC = Self-Reported Mood x Mood Condition 
 Pre-WMC-task mood: Retrospective mood-level ratings. Participants’ 
retrospective ratings for condition mood (mood-level variable) was not associated with 
WMC (r[193] = .02, p = .805), nor did mood level interact with condition valence or 
condition arousal in a follow-up hierarchical multiple regression analysis (|β|s < .11, ps 
≥ .150). Moreover, ratings for condition mood when analyzed separately also were not 





ps > .200). There was no statistical evidence that individuals were aware of the 
connection between their mood and their WMC scores. Importantly this means that, in 




 Post-WMC-task mood (state mood). To test whether WMC scores were 
associated with positive mood (elated, happy, calm), negative mood (sluggish, sad, 
nervous) or arousal (inactive, aroused) ratings immediately after the task, eight separate 
hierarchical regressions were run in which each state-mood item was entered with the 
valence- and arousal-condition variables in steps up to the three-way interaction. As in 
the previous studies, individuals with higher WMC scores reported feeling happier after 
the task (main effect; β = .22, p = .003), in addition to reporting low levels of 
inactiveness (main effect; β = -.15, p = .040). In other words, individuals who 
performed relatively well on the WMC task reported feeling happy and upbeat 
afterward.  
 An Arousal Ratings x Condition Arousal interaction (β = .17, p = .021) showed 
that individuals reporting an appropriately high level of arousal in high-arousal 
                                                          
2 A second set of analyses were run with hierarchical regressions that regressed WMC onto self-
reported retrospective ratings of valence and arousal, along with the condition variables of 
valence and arousal, in steps up to the four-way interaction. Self-reported positive and negative 
mood ratings were highly correlated (r = -.83, p < .001) and therefore combined into a single 
mood-valence rating score (positive minus negative rating). Arousal-based mood ratings of 
intensity and tiredness also were significantly correlated, albeit more modestly (r = -.17, p = 
.017). After preliminary analyses indicated similar results when the two measures were 
examined separately, a single mood-arousal rating score (intense minus tired rating) was 
computed and used. Emerging from the analysis was a significant Arousal Ratings x Condition 
Valence x Condition Arousal interaction (β = .25, p = .041). Interestingly, individuals feeling 
(appropriately) high levels of arousal in the nervous condition had especially high WMC scores 
(Mpv = 55.48) in comparison to individuals feeling (inappropriately) high levels of arousal in the 
sad condition who had especially low scores (Mpv = 39.71; β = .46, p = .054). The opposite 
pattern arose in positive mood conditions such that individuals feeling greater arousal in the 
calm condition had especially high WMC scores  (Mpv = 57.48) and those feeling high arousal 





conditions had higher WMC scores (Mpv = 49.72) than did those reporting relatively 
low arousal (Mpv = 41.98; β = .23, p = .020). Conversely, individuals reporting 
appropriately low levels of arousal in low-arousal conditions had higher WMC scores 
(Mpv = 48.14) than did those reporting relatively high arousal (Mpv = 43.83; β = -.13, p = 
.277). High WMC appears contingent on a person fully immersing themselves in the 
appropriate arousal-level for the mood condition, especially during nervousness and 
excitement.  
 Lastly, there was a significant Sluggishness Ratings x Condition Valence x 
Condition Arousal interaction (β = .15, p = .052), which showed that feeling sluggish 
was negatively associated with WMC scores in all conditions (βs = -.24 to -.15; .085 ≥ 
ps ≤ .300) except with sadness, in which these variables were positively related (β = .33, 
p = .075). Hence, the low-arousal negative feeling of sluggishness was associated with 
high WMC in the appropriate mood context (sadness), but not under any other 
circumstance. 
WMC = Emotionality x Mood Condition  
 The first three analyses tested the extent to which negative-positive 
emotionality, approach orientation, and avoidance orientation were associated with 
WMC as a function of mood condition. These analyses utilized hierarchical multiple 
regression by regressing WMC scores onto emotionality factor (variables entered 
separately), mood valence (0 = negative, 1 = positive), mood arousal (0 = low, 1 = 
high), and emotion reappraisal (continuous). On Step 1, all four main effect variables 
were mean-centered and entered. On Step 2, all six possible two-way interaction terms 





Step 4, the 4-way interaction term was entered. Correlations between WMC and 
questionnaire measures within mood-conditions are displayed in Table 6. Regression 
analyses are displayed in Table 7. 
 Negative-positive emotionality. There was a significant three-way interaction 
of Negative-Positive Emotionality x Condition Valence x Condition Arousal (β = .20, p 
= .012; Figure 3). In negative-mood conditions, negative emotionality was associated 
with low WMC (Mpv = 41.82) in the nervous condition, but high WMC (Mpv = 51. 31) 
in the sad condition (β = -.28, p = .066). By comparison, negative emotionality was 
associated with WMC that was moderate and indistinguishable between excited (Mpv = 
45.54) and calm (Mpv = 45.67) conditions (β =.00, p = .980). Negative mood states had 
the opposite effect on the WMC of individuals with positive emotionality, wherein 
positive emotionality was associated with low WMC (Mpv = 42.20) in the sad condition, 
but high WMC (Mpv = 53. 95) in the nervous condition (β = .34, p = .021). Positive 
emotionality was associated with similarly low WMC (Mpv = 40.89) in the excited 
condition (as the sad condition), but did not differ significantly from the moderately 
high WMC (Mpv = 47.14) scores in the calm condition (β = -.18, p = .239). Altogether, 
these findings suggest that sadness and nervousness have diametric effects on WMC in 
those with negative and positive emotionality. Moreover, whereas negative emotionality 
was associated with working memory restrictions during only nervousness, positive 
emotionality showed working memory restrictions during sadness and excitement, 
which suggests that theses latter individuals are emotionally responsive to a broader 





 The analysis also provided a significant interaction of Negative-Positive 
Emotionality x Emotion Reappraisal x Condition Arousal (β = -.17, p = .040). As 
Figure 4 illustrates, the extent to which high-arousal mood influenced the WMC of high 
negative-emotionality individuals was dependent on emotion-reappraisal tendencies. In 
high-arousal moods, negative-emotionality was associated with high WMC (Mpv = 
54.94) when the person’s emotion-reappraisal ability was high, but with low WMC (Mpv 
= 39.90) when emotional-reappraisal ability was low (β = -.32, p = .019). Whereas some 
individuals high in negative emotionality appear to have cognitive control over high-
arousal states (excitement and nervousness), perhaps down-regulating arousal to open 
up working memory resources, others with negative emotionality either do not have 
these controlled regulation abilities or choose not to use them, allowing emotions to 
take control of cognition.  
 Approach orientation. The analysis including approach orientation as a 
moderator variable provided a significant four-way Approach Orientation x Emotion 
Reappraisal x Mood Valence x Mood Arousal interaction (β =.16, p = .041). Figure 5 
displays predicted values for this interaction, and show that the statistical action largely 
was in excited and nervous conditions. In the excited condition, approach-orientated 
individuals low in emotion appraisal had especially low WMC (Mpv = 29.77) in 
comparison to the other approach-appraisal combinations (collapsed Mpv = 48.54). In 
the nervous condition, low approach-orientated individuals high in emotion appraisal 
had especially high WMC (Mpv = 60.74) in comparison to individuals with other 
approach-appraisal combinations (collapsed Mpv = 46.09). Individuals high in approach 





only when excited feelings truly take over and are not (or cannot be) regulated. 
Alternatively, one advantage of low-approach orientation may be the ability to have 
working memory resources available in stressful circumstances (e.g., cognitively cool 
under pressure), however this advantage appears restricted to those who successfully 
regulate their emotions via reappraisal.    
 Avoidance orientation. BIS was not a significant main-effect predictor of 
WMC when the task was preceded by mood inductions (β = .03, p = .661), and none of 
the interactions involving BIS was significant (|β|s ≤ .10, ps > .200). Not surprisingly, 
BIS and negative-positive emotionality variables were similar in predicting WMC in 
negative-mood conditions; only correlations involving BIS were statistically weaker 
(nervous: High BIS was associated with low WMC [r = -.14]; sad: High BIS was 
associated with high WMC [r = .15]). Indeed, the factor loading for BIS on the 
negative-emotionality variable was relatively high (Table 5), BIS typically is included 
in negative-emotionality measures  (cf. Elliot & Thrash, 2002), and including BIS in the 
negative-positive emotionality variable did not influence the reported WMC findings. 
Consequently, BAS is treated as another basic feature of negative emotionality.  
 Evaluative self-organization. In order to test the self-organization model, a 
hierarchical multiple regression was used to regress WMC onto self-organization (phi), 
differential importance (DI), self-concept negativity (neg), condition valence, and 
condition arousal in steps: Step 1 entered main effect terms, mean centered; Step 2 
entered two-way interaction terms; Step 3 entered three-way interaction terms; and Step 
4 entered four-way interaction terms.
3
 Note that emotion reappraisal was not included 
                                                          
3
 A five-way interaction term was not entered on a Step 5 of the regression analysis due to insufficient 





as a moderator because this variable is conceptually redundant with the coping 
mechanisms described to be at the root of the evaluative self-organization model (cf. 
Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2011). The regression analysis is displayed in Table 8. 
 The analysis produced a significant Phi x Neg x Condition Valence x Condition 
Arousal interaction (β = -.25, p = .032). As illustrated in Figure 6, predictable variability 
in WMC was found primarily in calm and excited conditions. In the calm condition, 
negative integration was associated with especially low WMC (Mpv = 16.63) in 
comparison to all other self-organizations (collapsed Mpv = 46.48); namely, integration 
was associated with significantly lower WMC than was compartmentalization in 
individuals with high negative self-concept content (β = -.93, p = .023). In the excited 
condition, negative compartmentalization was associated with lower WMC (Mpv = 
60.84) than was positive compartmentalization (Mpv = 38.88; β = -.65, p = .023). 
Overall, compartmentalization was not associated with especially strong reactions to 
mood manipulations that restrict WMC, and therefore findings were inconsistent with 
predictions. Explanations are saved for the Phase 2 discussion section.  
Follow-up Analyses: Emotionality and Self-Reported Mood  
 Mood-level correlates. First, regressions were performed on the mood-level 
variable (ratings for condition mood) to determine whether emotional individuals 
reported experiencing more extreme moods during the mood induction, thus explaining 
why mood had a more dramatic effect on their WMC. The previous four hierarchical 
regressions again were performed after substituting WMC scores with mood-level 
ratings as the criterion. Three significant findings emerged from these analyses (outside 





Reappraisal x Condition Valence interaction was significant in regressions involving 
approach (β = .15, p = .036) and avoidance orientation (β = .18, p = .014), but was 
slightly mitigated by negative-positive emotionality (β = .12, p = .108). Overall, 
individuals high in emotion reappraisal reported experiencing especially high levels of 
positive mood (excitement and calm), but reported equivalent levels of negative mood 
(nervous and sad) as low appraisers. This suggests that emotion reappraisal more 
specifically captures the ability to up-regulate positive emotions than abilities to down-
regulate negative emotions. An Avoidance Orientation x Condition Valence interaction 
(β = .15, p = .051) indicated that individuals high in avoidance orientation experienced 
disproportionally high levels positive mood. Avoidance-orientated individuals, despite 
their anxious disposition, appear (1) capable of experiencing strong positive emotion 
and (2) not particularly overwhelmed by negative emotion. Lastly, there was a Phi x 
Neg x DI interaction (β = -.22, p = .033). Individuals with “genuine” positive 
compartmentalization (high DI and low neg) and genuine negative 
compartmentalization (low DI and high neg) reported experiencing higher levels of the 
condition mood than did compartmentalized individuals with high negative self-beliefs 
but viewed their positive self-aspects as most important (and vice versa). Integrative 
individuals with high DI (view their positive selves as relatively important) but with 
high neg (relatively high amounts of negative self-content) reported disproportionately 
high levels of the condition mood, relative other integrative individuals. Integratives 
who are especially secure with their negative qualities experience strong mood states, 
presumably because they are more comfortable with emotionally letting go of the self 





 Negative-positive emotionality was not associated with reported mood level; 
however, this possibly was due to the fact that both positive-emotionality and negative 
emotionality individuals (i.e., highly emotional people in general) experience a number 
of positive and negative moods rather strongly or intensely. Therefore, the negative-
positive emotionality variable was transformed by squaring scores so that high scores 
represented high emotionality irrespective of valence. There was a main effect of this 
general high emotionality variable on mood level (β = .16, p = .025) that was not 
moderated by mood condition. Emotional people reported experiencing stronger moods 
across conditions, despite displaying disparate cognitive-affective reactions to those 
moods in the WMC task. This suggests the intriguing possibility that positive- and 
negative-emotionality individuals experience strong, intense moods across conditions, 
but those states actually are experienced as qualitatively distinct emotions. For example, 
when positive-emotionality individuals feel strong sadness, they actually experience a 
different form of sadness than do negative-emotionality individuals.  
 WMC analyses controlling for mood level. Mood level was not associated 
with WMC (r = .02), thus it was unlikely that these mood ratings could explain (i.e., 
mediate) the WMC variability predicted by emotionality variables. Indeed, analyses that 
controlled for mood level had no influence on the interactions reported for WMC with 
negative-positive emotionality (first listed, β = .20, p = .012; second listed, β = -.17, p = 
.039), approach orientation (β = .16, p = .040), and evaluative self-organization (β = -
.26, p = .029). Moreover, controlling for all four retrospective ratings of excited, calm, 





feeling excited when nervous could not explain fully the negative correlation between 
WMC and negative-positive emotionality in the nervous condition).  
 WMC analyses excluding low mood-level participants. To ensure that WMC 
findings were not influenced unduly by participants unable or unwilling to get into 
condition mood states, another set of regressions were performed after excluding 
individuals reporting a mood level of “1” (not at all; n = 2) or  “2” (n = 11). These 
exclusions had no influence on the reported interactions: Negative-positive emotionality 
(first listed, β = .23, p = .004; second listed, β = -.19, p = .028), approach orientation (β 
= .20, p = .015), and evaluative self-organization (β = -.23, p = .059). Interestingly, the 
previously non-significant main effect of approach orientation (N = 195; β = -.11, p = 
.139) was significant in the restricted sample (N = 182; β = -.18, p = .017). Thus, high 
approach orientation was associated with low WMC in individuals experiencing 
sufficiently high levels of the condition mood state, irrespective of mood type.  
 Predicting post-WMC-task mood. A final set of analyses tested whether the 
relationship between WMC scores and post-task low-arousal happiness ratings could be 
explained by emotionality variables. First, a multiple regression analysis entering 
happiness and inactivity ratings simultaneously showed that happiness ratings uniquely 
predicted WMC (β = -.15, p = .049) but inactive ratings did not (β =.07, p = .366). 
Consequently, the focus was placed on explaining happiness ratings statistically. 
Happiness ratings were correlated only with the variables of positive-negative 
emotionality (r = -.27, p < .001) and emotion reappraisal (r = .13, p = .070), so these 
factors were the prime candidates for predicting happiness ratings. To test this 





interactions (Step 4) in the positive-negative emotionality regression to determine if 
happiness ratings explained unique variance that the negative-positive emotionality and 
emotion reappraisal interactions did not. Happy ratings remained a significant predictor 
on Step 5 of the regression (β = .18, p = .028), which indicates that happiness ratings 
arrive from sources outside of emotionality, such as task enjoyment.   
Discussion 
 The conditions in which executive functioning produce high WMC scores varied 
as a function of mood state and individual differences in emotionality (e.g., affective 
temperament). Most notably, these data indicate that WMC is not a stable, trait-based 
ability, at least in highly emotional individuals. The cognition of high emotionality 
individuals is flexible, shifting from narrowed to broadened WMC as a function of 
emotional context.  Thus, these findings are consistent with motivational intensity 
model (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013) and suggest that the attentional processes underlying 
global-local orientation also contribute to more sophisticated cognitive processes 
involving executive attention (Engle, 2002). Listed below are some of the major 
implications of Phase 2 findings, focusing on the role of emotions in regulating 
cognitive processes. 
Emotions restrict cognitive executive processing based on the motivational strength of 
an emotion 
 Positive- and negative-emotionality individuals had different cognitive-affective 
reactions to the same moods, presumably because these moods activate different 
motivational qualities. Negative-emotionality individuals are sensitive to nervousness 





because these moods evoke these individuals’ dominant motivationally intense states; 
WMC restricts in the service of avoidance and approach goals, respectively (promotes 
action orientation). These reactions likely are functional for the individuals a number of 
contexts, but provide suboptimal conditions for performance on the WMC task. 
Interestingly, positive emotionality also was associated with especially low WMC in the 
sad condition, which suggests sadness may be a particularly aversive state to these 
individuals. This may be due to positive-emotionality individuals not being particularly 
accustomed to feelings of failure and loss. Collectively, high negative-emotionality 
individuals (e.g., high in neuroticism) appear particularly sensitive to the potential for 
failure or loss (nervousness) whereas positive-emotionality individuals are more greatly 
influenced by failure or loss (sadness). 
Emotional people must be “in the mood” for high WMC 
 Interestingly, while nervousness and sadness provided suboptimal WMC 
conditions for some high emotionality individuals, these same states provided optimal 
conditions for others.  Positive-emotionality individuals had relatively high WMC 
scores in the nervous condition and negative-emotionality individuals had relatively 
high WMC scores in the sad condition. Executive functioning may be optimized by 
opening up resources to attend to information more broadly (or globally) because these 
states are not particularly motivating for these individuals (e.g., Carver, 2006; Gable & 
Harmon-Jones, 2012). These states may allow individuals to regroup, sort out their 
experiences, plan, and reprioritize goals until the requisite emotion that motivates action 
(excitement or anxiety) is initiated.  Positive-emotionality individuals perhaps are 





as a particularly negative state (e.g., do not anticipate negative outcomes). Indeed, in the 
nervous condition, positive emotionality was associated with calm (r = -.21, p = .031) 
and low sadness (r = .29, p = .043); although these ratings did not statistically mediate 
the interaction. On the other hand, capacity advantages for negative-emotionality 
individuals extended from sadness. This mechanism may serve to increase their 
accuracy in understanding themselves in relation to their social worlds (cf. depressive 
realism; Alloy & Abramson, 1988), as well as lead to the up-regulation of anxiety once 
a goal is prioritized. Accordingly, anxiety and sadness may swing in a self-perpetuating 
cycle, which is particularly effective in driving successful goal acquisition when anxiety 
potentiates action toward goals (e.g., high-functioning neuroticism) or especially 
ineffective when anxiety leads to actions away from goals (e.g., withdrawal) or inaction 
(e.g., inhibition or learned helplessness).  
Excitement is good for motivation, but bad for WMC, in approach-orientated 
individuals 
   The traditional “appetitive” reaction that motivates reward-seeking behavior in 
high approach-orientated individuals appears exaggerated in individuals low in emotion 
reappraisal. These individuals become fully entrenched in excitement, their default 
motivational state, but apparently do not do so through controlled cognitive means. 
Instead, they may simply seek-out and react to potential reinforcers in their 
environments (e.g., sensation seekers; Zuckerman, 2009), with little planning or 
cognitive framing (i.e., do not cognitively up-regulate excitement), which may explain 
their low levels of trait self-control. On the other end of the spectrum, low approach-





calibrated for dealing with anxious situations, wherein they experience ideal conditions 
for executive functioning. These individuals may be adept at thinking under 
circumstances that outwardly seem stressful.  
Introspection fails to account for WMC variability in high-emotionality individuals 
because they experience moods differently 
 The WMC variability predicted by emotionality variables was not explainable 
through self-reported mood ratings, which indicates that these cognitive-affective 
reactions are not detectable through introspection or attributed to one’s feelings. 
Namely, people did not blame their affect for poor performance. First, individuals likely 
are unable truly to know the objective strength of their emotional reaction. For instance, 
a person does not know if his sadness is a little more or less potent than others’ sadness. 
Second, the mood inductions seemingly created qualitatively distinct emotional 
experiences in individuals differing in negative- and positive-emotionality: The same 
emotional context (mood condition) produced completely separable cognitive-affect 
effects, particularly in negative- and positive-emotionality individuals. Importantly, 
these differences are invisible in people’s conceptual and semantic representations of 
emotional states: High-emotionality individuals reported experiencing equally high 
levels of condition mood despite those moods having different influences on cognitive 
processing. People assume that their feelings are similar to as another’s feelings (e.g., 







Affective reactivity does not restrict WMC in individuals with evaluatively 
compartmentalized self-organization 
 While inconsistent with hypotheses, findings involving evaluative self-
organization do converge with the results of Ditzfeld and Showers (2014) involving 
typical and preferred affect states, which show that compartmentalized individuals 
prefer high-arousal positive states (e.g., excitement) whereas integratives prefer low-
arousal states (e.g., calm). Accordingly, positive compartmentalized individuals perhaps 
show higher WMC in excited states because excitement constitutes their most 
comfortable emotion, and therefore makes available the attentional resources needed to 
perform well on the WMC task. By contrast, negative integratives may be captivated by 
calm mood. Negative integratives show particularly strong preferences for low-arousal 
positive states, likely because this state represents an ideal state that they may find 
difficult to achieve. Consequently, the calm mood manipulation may provide ideal 
conditions for negative integratives because the exercise creates a distraction from their 
worries, similar in some respects to a mindfulness manipulation (e.g., Grossman, 
Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004). Movement from calm mood into a challenging 
high-pace cognitive task threatens to vanquish a valued mood state (e.g., Wegener & 
Petty, 1994), so negative-integrative individuals perhaps are reluctant to fully commit 
themselves to the WMC task and risk losing their positive state or possibly are 
perturbed by the gifting and subsequent ungifting of calm mood. 
STUDY 1 BASELINE WMC REVISTED 
 A final set of analyses were run on the baseline WMC data from Study 1 using 





emotionality and approach-orientation variable was calculated,
4
 and then entered into 
two separate multiple regression analyses that entered the emotionality factor, post-
WMC-task happiness rating, and post-WMC-task arousal rating simultaneously (see 
Table 9). Baseline WMC was correlated positively (and uniquely) with negative-
positive emotionality (β = .24, p = .058; two-tailed) and post-task happiness (β = .37, p 
< .01; two-tailed).
5
 Thus, negative-emotionality was associated with higher baseline 
WMC, which strengthens support for the over-controlled cognition hypothesis posited 
in Study 1. Moreover, post-task happiness ratings again provided a unique predictor of 
WMC. The robustness of post-task positive mood to correlate with WMC scores 
suggests that task enjoyment may play a key role in successful cognitive performance.  
Importantly, task enjoyment may link WMC measures to other cognitive tasks (e.g., 
fluid intelligence; J. C. Raven, J. Raven, & Court, 1998) whereby superior performance 
extends from task engagement instead of cognitive ability alone.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Across three studies, the WMC of individuals high in emotionality was 
contingent on emotional context. Study 1 provided evidence of a slight executive 
functioning advantage in negative-emotionality individuals. Behavioral inhibition 
sensitivity, and to lesser degree neuroticism, was associated with high WMC in baseline 
conditions. In Study 2, high trait anxiety was associated with low WMC under 
conditions of anxiety but not under conditions of calm. In Study 3, negative 
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 Negative-positive emotionality variable included BIS for reasons described in Analytic Phase 2 of Study 
3. The self-control measure (SCS) was unavailable for inclusion in the approach orientation measure. See 
Table 9 for full list of measures included in factor scoring.  
5
 Alternatively, in an analysis that excluded 1 participant for a zero AOSPAN score and entered negative-
positive emotionality, approach orientation, happiness rating, and arousal rating simultaneously, both 
negative-positive emotionality (β = .30, p = .032) and happiness rating (β = .30, p = .040) significantly 






emotionality again was associated with relatively low WMC in a nervous condition, but 
relatively high WMC in a sad condition. By contrast, positive emotionality was 
associated with low WMC in a sad condition, but relatively high WMC in a nervous 
condition. In addition, positive emotionality was associated with relatively low WMC in 
an excited condition. 
Action-Deliberation Model  
Affect states are modeled to enact an action-deliberation tradeoff based on the 
motivational qualities of the feeling state. Nervousness and excitement were associated 
with cognitive narrowing (low WMC) in positive- and negative-emotionality 
individuals, respectively. These motivationally intense states are postulated to prioritize 
action through goal-focus (i.e., lock people into avoidance or approach goals). By 
contrast, sadness and nervousness was associated with cognitive broadening (high 
WMC) in negative- and positive-emotionality individuals, respectively. These 
presumably low motivationally intense states (viz., low approach) are postulated to 
promote deliberation (e.g., goal formation, planning, problem solving, etc.). 
Interestingly, sadness restricted executive functioning (low WMC) in positive-
emotionality individuals. Apparently, positive-emotionality individuals do not fret over 
the possibility of failure or loss (low avoidance-orientation) and actually benefit 
cognitively from added pressure (e.g., anxiety produces optimal-arousal); however, they 
take failure and loss hard. Their sadness seemingly restricts and captures attention (e.g., 
Simon, 1967), although no action likely can undo the outcome (unique from Carver, 





hoc in the service of learning from mistakes and engendering motives for improving 
future actions (cf. functional counterfactual thinking; Epstude, & Roese, 2008). 
Regulation and Flexible Cognition  
Emotion generation and emotion regulation appear to be concurrent, 
coterminous processes (Campos et al., 2004), wherein the cognitive faculties deemed 
necessary for emotion regulation are modulated by emotions themselves. These data 
support state-based models of WMC (Ilkowska & Engle, 2010) and accord with 
preexisting cognition-affect models including Pessoa’s (2009) neurological emotion-
directed executive control framework, the integrated process model of stereotype threat 
(Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008), and motivational accounts of emotions (e.g., 
Bradley & Lang, 2000). Importantly, shifts in WMC scores highlight the importance of 
accounting for context and personality in human responding (Person x Situation; Lewin, 
1935; Mischel, 2004). Namely, a cognitive-affect system (Mischel & Shoda, 1995) 
approach was adopted to predict WMC in regard to if-then reactions based on 
emotionality and mood state. For example, if someone with negative emotionality is in a 
sad (anxious) mood, then WMC is predicted to be high (low).  
The broadening-narrowing of WMC is conceptually consistent with dual-
process models of cognition. Fluctuations in executive functioning presumably reflect 
shifts between automatic (System 1) and controlled (System 2) processing (Kahneman, 
2011; Stanovich, 1999) and therefore can be connected to a large body of research (for a 
review, Evans 2008). States associated with low and high WMC may promote 
automatic and controlled processing, respectively, and therefore should predict many of 





processing in positive- and negative-emotionality individuals, respectively. Automatic 
processing is associated with greater use of stereotyping (Macrae, Milne, & 
Bodenhausen, 1994), correspondence bias (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988), peripheral-
route attitude formation (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), conservative ideology (Eidelman, 
Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012), self-affirmation (Swann & Schroeder, 1995), 
and strong adherence to the cultural worldview (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 
1997). In fact, negative-emotionality individuals’ generally high WMC may reflect a 
particularly strong reliance on controlled processing in their everyday lives (e.g., need 
for cognition Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Indeed, research on 
depressive realism shows that dysphoria is associated with excessive controlled 
processing, at least in laboratory settings (Pacini, Muir, & Epstein, 1998).  
 Affective reactions can be (and often are) potentiated by conscious sources 
through the cognitive up-regulation of emotion and mood (as participants did in the 
current studies). However, once affect is elicited, it is suspected to modulate some of 
the same cognitive mechanisms that initiated the feeling state. Affect, in effect, takes 
control of cognition. Although the data provide only clues to neurological processing, 
the current theorizing is built on the belief that affect often precedes cognition in the 
sequences of events (Zajonc; 1980, 1984); affect systems underlying personality 
differences extend from different motivational origins (e.g., Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; 
J. A. Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990) that lie deep in the 
primitive, subcortical architecture of the brain (Panksepp, 1998); affective reactions 
move upward through neural pathways to the left-right brain hemispheres associated 





(Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000; Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2010; Volberg 
& Hübner, 2004); and, at this point, affect influences executive functioning in brain 
regions responsible for working memory (viz., prefrontal cortex; Kane & Engle, 2002).  
Negative Emotionally: An Instrumental Account  
 Negative emotionality was associated with relatively superior cognitive-control 
abilities under baseline and sad-mood conditions. These contexts may increase 
attentional resources that promote self-evaluation and deliberation over current and 
future actions, likely with a prevention focus (Higgins, 1996; Idson, Liberman, & 
Higgins, 2004). Anxiety, on the other hand, was associated with restricted WMC. In 
regard to a process, the end state of deliberation likely is to shift toward goal-focus 
wherein the self is called into action through the up-regulation of anxiety (sadness-
anxiety cycle), which activates behavioral engagement (approach-orientated behavior) 
or disengagement (goal abandonment). In the deliberation stage, negative-emotionality 
individuals appear highly selective when prioritizing goals, and rightfully so because 
they also tend to expend high levels of cognitive energy when working toward goal 
achievement (Roskes, Elliot, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2013). Indeed, neurotic traits are 
associated with elevated and sustained levels of effort, at least to the degree that their 
performance exceeds others’ expectations (whereas extraverts typically fall short; 
Bendersky, & Shah, 2013). This may be a positive side effect of self-presentation and 
social comparison concerns (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2001). Cognitive up-regulation of 
anxiety confers evolutionary advantages (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Buss, 1990; 
Nesse, 1999). Mentally summonsing one’s own anxieties functionally serves to 





threat and potentiate insecurities that drive normative social behavior, among other 
benefits. Thus, it is not terribly surprising that negative-emotionality is associated with 
high cognitive-control ability that, at times, may be over-controlled, which increases 
proneness to chronic stress and its attached side effects (Sapolsky, 2004).  
Realistically, the anxiety-sadness cycle gives way to positive emotion from time 
to time. The primary positive emotion of negative-emotionality individuals is theorized 
to be relief, which arrives at the resolution of an anxious event (Baas, De Dreu, & 
Nijstad, 2011; Carver, 2004; Fredrickson, Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000; 
Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). However, even “neurotic pessimists” (Hamachek, 
1978) do show pride following accomplishments (Stoeber, Harris, & Moon, 2007). 
Nevertheless, positive emotional experiences may be short-lived and replaced quickly 
by upgraded levels of personal standards and higher self-aspirations (Stoeber, 
Hutchfield, & Wood, 2008), as articulated by hedonic treadmill (Brickman & 
Campbell, 1971; Kahneman, 1999). On the upside, negative-emotionality individuals 
seem unlikely to “coast” for long periods before changing goal focus and moving onto 
another task (cf. Carver, 2003).  
Negative-emotionality individuals show self-discrepancies between real-self and 
ought-self (Manian, Strauman, & Denney, 1998), which suggests that their self-
expectations are at times unrealistically high. Therefore goal abandonment sometimes is 
necessary and even ideal.  Interestingly, goal abandonment and even goal failure may 
produce conflictive feelings, such as a mixture of disappointment and relief (e.g., mixed 
emotion; Larsen & McGraw, 2011). In fact, this feeling may characterize their sadness 





Overall, relief may play important roles in these processes, but its study currently is 
under represented in the research (cf. Sweeny & Vohs, 2012). 
 Negative-emotionality individuals are believed to up-regulate anxiety in the 
service of accomplishing their goals, at times purposely and at other times automatically 
(Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). Regulation research largely has undervalued negative 
emotions, but they serve instrumental functions (Campos, Walle, Dahl, & Main, 2011; 
Mischel et al., 1989; Tamir, 2009). For example, individuals high in neuroticism choose 
to worry and experience fear in order to promote successful performance (Tamir & 
Ford, 2009), and these strategies have the desired effect (Tamir, 2005). If anxiety 
promotes preparation by kicking an individual into gear (e.g., improves study habits by 
leading students to study prior to the night before the exam), then it is easy to see the 
potential functionality of neuroticism. Even the apparent downside of negative 
emotionality, high anxiety and restricted WMC under pressure, in some circumstances 
may be beneficial. If preparation and practice improve competency, then anxiety may 
produce “optimal arousal” and allows anxious individuals to rely on their dominant 
responses (e.g., puts them in the “zone”), as characterized by social facilitation (Zajonc, 
1965). Naturally, when competency is not achieved, these same individuals may “chock 
under pressure” (e.g., Baumeister & Showers, 1986). Indeed, the difference between 
success and failure in negative-emotionality individuals appears to extend from 
preparation factors: Defensive pessimists are successful whereas self-handicappers are 
not (Elliot & Church, 2003).  
Pursuit of successful performance. Anxiety is purported to be part of a 





goal and potential failure (Carver, 2006). If anxiety promotes action toward the goal, 
then the likelihood of success ordinarily will increase, which in the long run produces 
positive emotion (e.g., relief and pride). However, if anxiety is treated as the problem, 
then the focus turns toward emotion regulation and not on the source of anxiety. 
Consequently, anxiety fails to dissipate because no progress is made toward the goal 
and the person feels powerless against their emotions because their regulation attempts 
fail. Overall, a chronic tendency to blame negative mood and coping failures for one’s 
failures may set in motion a self-defeating pattern of self-handicapping and 
unaccomplished goals (e.g., Baumeister, 1997; Baumgardner, Lake, & Arkin, 1985; 
Zuckerman, Kieffer, & Knee, 1998). 
 Cultural beliefs about anxiety may have a third-variable (mediating) effect on 
unsuccessful outcomes. The glamorization of positive emotions in the positive 
psychology movement (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Fredrickson, 1998; Lyubomirsky, 
King, & Diener, 2005; Seligman, 2002) may contribute to a stigmatization of 
neuroticism traits (e.g., views of negative emotionality as a weakness). If science says 
positive emotions promote success across a number of life domains, then people likely 
will see them as critical for success. This raises the possibility that beliefs about the 
detrimental effects of anxiety are playing a role in creating unsuccessful outcomes (self-
fulfilling prophecy; Bargh & Chen, 1997). “I am going to fail because I’m anxious,” 
presumably sets the stage for failure. Thus, neuroticism salience to some degree elicits a 
stereotype threat effect (e.g., R. Brown & Pinel, 2003). Without accounting for this 






Pursuit of happiness. Humans value happiness (Myers, 2000) and negative 
emotions seem discordant with this happiness ideal (e.g., Kahneman, 1999). In reality, 
negative emotions are not at odds with happiness and, in fact, often are instrumental in 
achieving it. Ironically, people may be happier in the long run if they listen to their 
negative emotions instead of attempting of down-regulating them. Thus, refocusing 
people toward the instrumental value of negative emotions may diminish their negative 
effects on self and behavior (Crum et al., 2013; Park & Helgeson, 2006). For example, 
negative-emotion acceptance (e.g., Hayes, 2004) is associated with better coping to 
negative events, heightened pain tolerance, and lowered susceptibility to depression 
(Braams, Belchert, Boden, & Gross, 2012; Shallcross, Troy, Boland, & Mauss, 2010). 
Negative-emotionality individuals also appear to use negative emotions to their social 
advantage, such as up-regulating sadness in order to increase helping in others 
(Hackenbracht & Tamir, 2010). In addition, negative emotionality is associated with 
high sensitivity to social acceptance/rejection (e.g., approval contingencies; Crocker, 
Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003; Sargent, Crocker, & Luhtanen, 2005), which 
may promote emotional responsiveness (e.g., compassionate concern). Responsiveness 
is associated with long-term well-being benefits by building strong relationships 
(Canevello & Crocker, 2010). By contrast, denying self-worth contingencies (“I 
shouldn’t care what others think about me”) negates the affective advantage. 
Consequently, important belongingness needs go unmet (cf. Baumeister & Leary, 1995) 
and no regulation strategy likely provides self-fulfillment in the absence of meaningful 





 Lastly, concern over the link between negative emotionality and unhappiness 
may be overblown. Negative emotionality certainly is associated with less positive 
emotion and lower satisfaction with life (Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997), however it 
is unclear whether these individuals personally strive for these traits. Negative-
emotionality individuals may not live up the happiness as defined by normative cultural 
standards (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Tsai, 2007), but live up to their own personal 
standards. For example, relief may be perfectly fine for some individuals, despite 
others’ insistence that enthusiasm and joy are prerequisites to being “happy”. Indeed, 
while negative-emotionality traits seem suboptimal in Western cultures, these same 
traits generally are regarded as ideal in Eastern cultures (Kitayama, Markus, & 
Kurokawa, 2000). Moreover, satisfaction with life for most people is a moving target 
(e.g., hedonic adaptation; Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999; Kahneman & Riis, 2005) 
that is motivated by growth needs (Maslow, 1954). Acknowledging that there is room 
for self-improvement may reflect self-awareness rather than a major personality flaw.  
Positive Emotionality: Allowing Positive Emotions To Take Control 
  Positive-emotionality individuals showed similar cognitive-affective advantages 
and disadvantages as those with negative emotionality. Excitement narrowed cognition 
(action focus) whereas nervousness broadened cognition (deliberation focus). Calm 
failed to show the hypothesized broadening effect, which may be due to some positive-
emotionality individuals failing to discriminate among positive states (e.g., valence 
focus; Barrett, 2006b). In other words, these individuals perhaps struggle to taper their 
enthusiasm when experiencing positive emotions. In a similar vein, anxiety and 





emotionality individuals. Instead of focusing on the potential for failure, these 
individuals may see opportunities for success optimistically (Scheier, Carver, & 
Bridges, 1994; Peterson, 2000). These individuals appear to some degree approach 
orientated because they are motivated by appetitive drives (e.g., rewards or fun; Carver 
& White, 1994), but they have a broader emotional repertoire than strictly approach-
orientated individuals (e.g., extraverts).     
 Pursuit of successful performance. One major advantage of positive 
emotionality is that action states (e.g., excitement, enthusiasm) may feel as positive (or 
more so) than the feelings of reward following accomplishments. Hence, action states 
lock positive-emotionality individuals into positive states in the fashion of intrinsic 
motivation or flow (Keller, & Bless, 2008; Nakamura & M. Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; 
Ryan & Deci, 2000). These individuals “love” what they do while the emotional state 
minimizes access to self-concerns. Moreover, anxiety appears to have beneficial, 
broadening cognitive effect. Added stress may drive may improved cognitive 
performance, especially on intensive executive-functioning and creative tasks. 
Interestingly, procrastination may pay off for positive-emotionality individuals (e.g., 
Chu & Choi, 2005), which differentiates them from genuinely approach-orientated 
extraverts who are prone to procrastination and its undesirable effects (Freeman, Cox-
Fuenzalida, & Stoltenberg, 2011; Steel, Brothen, & Wambach, 2001). 
 The potential downsides to positive-emotionality are twofold. First, the 
narrowing of cognition during action states is good for motivation but seemingly poor 
for executive functioning. Excitement had symmetric effects with low WMC shown 





performance on tasks that require intensive executive function, at least when the 
individual has not developed task competency. It is also possible that feelings of 
excitement simply decreased motivation on the WMC task (cf. Wegener & Petty, 1994). 
Second, positive-emotionality individuals may struggle to become motivated toward 
tasks that are not intrinsically enjoyable, which limits the number of domains in which 
they will be successful. Essentially, they save their energies for performance domains 
they “love”. Unfortunately, love is fickle. After all, simply adding rewards to a 
previously intrinsically enjoyable task typically makes the task less enjoyable (Deci, 
Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). Enthusiasm likely fades over time and is replaced by the 
desire for a fresh start elsewhere.  
 Pursuit of happiness. If the definition of happiness is the amount of time spent 
experiencing positive minus negative emotion (Kahneman, 1999), then positive-
emotionality individuals are happy by definition. This happiness likely is sustained by 
the interpersonal social benefits of their personalities (e.g., Madon, Smith, Jussim, 
Russell, Eccles, Palumbo, & Walkiewicz, 2001). For example, people signaling high 
self-esteem are believed to have positive personality characteristics (Zeigler-Hill, 
Besser, Myers, Southard, & Malkin, 2013) and are viewed as more desirable romantic 
partner (Zeigler-Hill & Myers, 2011). However, because these positive-emotionality 
traits generally are valued culturally, they also are more likely shaped to fit cultural 
norms (e.g., Hogg, 2012; Kurzban, & Aktipis, 2007). Thus, in some cases a positive 
façade may veil over hidden vulnerabilities (Zeigler-Hill & Showers, 2007). When 
positive-emotional personalities fail to provide social benefits, then they may be 





negativity; Garland, Fredrickson, Kring, Johnson, Meyer, & Penn, 2010), a process 
represented by the low WMC scores in the sad-mood condition. This potential for 
instability (high “highs” but also low “lows”) may make these individuals particularly 
susceptible to depression (Kernis, Whisenhunt, Waschull, Greenier, Berry, Herlocker, 
& Anderson, 1998) and perhaps more so than with negative emotionality. Whereas 
negative-emotionality individuals may habituate and learn to deal with to their negative 
emotions, positive-emotionality individuals may be unaccustomed to negative emotions 
and cognitive-affectively ill-equipped to cope. 
Low Emotionality and Cognitive Stability 
 Low-emotionality individuals had moderate scores on the negative-positive 
emotionality measure (i.e., line-midpoints on Figure 3). Low emotionality was 
associated with moderate and invariant WMC scores across mood conditions. Less 
emotional people did not experience the condition moods as intensely, which apparently 
promoted cognitive stability.  Accordingly, low emotionality was associated with 
modest advantages in some circumstances (e.g., higher WMC than negative-
emotionality individuals in the anxious condition) and modest disadvantages in others 
(e.g., lower WMC than negative-emotionality individuals in the sad condition).  
Evaluative Self-Organization 
Evaluative compartmentalization was not associated with the predicted 
cognitive-affective reactions outlined by the affective reactivity hypothesis. 
Incorporating another approach to self-organization, the multiple self-aspect framework 
(McConnell, 2011), may be more effective in predicting WMC by influencing mood 





compartmentalized individuals’ specific self-aspects that contain self-attributes that are 
strictly positive (Tim’s scholarly self) or strictly negative (Tim’s basketball self) may 
create the appropriate emotional contexts that narrow cognition and lower WMC. 
Ultimately, however, working memory restrictions simply may not play a role in 
compartmentalization process. The affective reactivity hypothesis does not hinge 
entirely on the WMC component of the model. Valence cues may anchor 
categorization, which links positive-with-positive and negative-with-negative stimuli 
(e.g., self-beliefs, concepts, and faces; Ditzfeld & Showers, 2011, 2013b, 2014), but not 
because of executive functioning restrictions (viz., poor emotion-regulation ability). In 
fact, additional evidence for the categorization component of affective reactivity 
hypothesis was found in preliminary analyses (previously not discussed) on the Study 3 
affect evaluation task (Robinson et al., 2004). In this task, picture stimuli varying in 
valence and arousal qualities are categorized as pleasant or unpleasant as quickly as 
possible. Compartmentalized individuals recorded faster affect-evaluation speeds across 
all affect picture stimuli than did integratives, with the most pronounced speed 
differences in high- and low-arousal positive picture sets. Thus, compartmentalized 
individuals are quick to respond to and categorize valenced stimuli, irrespective of 
arousal quality, and particularly sensitive to positive affective qualities.  
Emotion Conceptualization and Differential Experience  
 Negative and positive emotionality individuals both reported experiencing mood 
states more intensely than those with low-emotionality. Taken alone this is not 
surprising, however when paired with the fact that these individuals displayed 





markedly more interesting. This arouses the possibility that people are using the same 
emotion label for qualitatively distinct experiences. Thus, when two people talk about 
their sadness they may not be talking about the same phenomenological state. For 
instance, sadness may be a low-arousal state of disappointment for one person 
(negative-emotionality), but a high-arousal state of distraught for another (positive-
emotionality individuals). For researchers, this puts into question the construct validity 
of self-reported emotion measures. 
 If emotion concepts are built on separable core-affect foundations, then 
variability in people’s conceptualizations of emotions seems rather probable. After all, 
even a cursory inspection of the over emotion literature makes clear that the number of 
definitions for emotions is roughly equivalent to the number of emotion researchers (cf. 
Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999). Chief among challengers to between-person homogeneity 
in emotional experience currently is Barrett (2014) as articulated by conceptual act 
theory. Namely, Barrett (1) argues that emotions are not natural kinds and therefore are 
irreducible to specific patterns of neural activation (Barrett, 2006c) and (2) treats 
emotional experiences as situated constructions that can vary among individuals based 
on affective behavioral adaptations (e.g., fight/flight), emotion conceptualization, 
emotion labels, cultural factors, and stochastic processes (Barrett et al., in press). 
Moreover, people vary in their conceptual representation of affect states (Barrett, 2004; 
Kashdan, Ferssizeidis, Collins, & Muraven, 2010), which indicates that at least 
semantically affect states mean different things to different people. Importantly, 





understanding emotion comprehensively and, in fact, failures to do so perhaps imposes 
a major impediment in advancing emotion research.  
Limitations  
 Focus in present studies was placed on qualities of the methodological design 
(e.g., AOSPAN as a dependent, rather than moderator, variable); therefore limitations 
likely extend primarily from sampling issues. First, the sample size of Study 3 (N = 
195) puts into question the robustness of the reported four-way interactions. 
Consequently, the Negative-Positive Emotionality x Condition Mood interaction is 
considered the top emotionality-variable finding. Second, the Study 3 sample was 
approximately 80% female.
6
 Females appear more capable or willing than males to 
generate the mood states as instructed, particularly “powerless” emotions (e.g., sadness, 
fear; cf. Fischer, Mosquera, van Vianen, & Manstead, 2004) and display higher 
emotional ability in general (Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006); but 
see Barrett and Bliss-Moreau (2009). Note, sex was not associated with condition 
mood-level ratings (r = -.04, ns) or WMC (r = .04, ns), and males were not excluded 
disproportionately from analysis removing individuals with low mood-level ratings (N = 
13; 83% female, 17% male). Moreover, WMC effects still depend on the emotionality 
level of the female; therefore, participant sex may serve as an important moderator 
variable, but did not account for the present findings. Third, the mood-induction 
procedure combined personally relevant emotional experience and mood-setting music 
to provide a potentially multiplicative emotional punch that, although considered a 
strength of the present design, does leave unclear whether reliving an emotional event, 
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music type, or the combination of the two is responsible for the produced moods. This 
approach allowed emotional idiosyncrasies into the design, which is problematic if the 
produced moods did not appear non-random. Although it is unclear how exactly 
emotional experiences were differentiated qualitatively at this point, the data suggest 
negative-emotionality individuals share similar emotional experiences that are distinct 
from positive-emotionality individuals, who share similar emotional experiences of 
their own.  
Conclusion 
  The current findings highlight the importance of emotional context in cognitive-
affective processing. Specifically, the faculties deemed critical in emotion regulation 
were modulated by emotions themselves (Campos et al., 2004). Across 3 studies, high 
emotional people were not limited by their cognitive control abilities (WMC), but rather 
their WMC shifted as a function of emotional state. Indices of negative emotionality 
were associated with high WMC in baseline (Study 1) and sad (Study 3) conditions, but 
with low WMC in anxious and nervous conditions (Studies 2 and 3). By contrast, 
positive emotionality was associated with low WMC in excited and sad conditions, but 
with high WMC in a nervous condition (Study 3). High-emotionality individuals’ 
responsiveness to emotional context appears to promote cognitive flexibility (e.g., 
Harmon-Jones et al., 2012), wherein motivationally intense states narrow cognition 
(action focus) and less motivationally intense states broaden cognition (deliberation 
focus). Thus, the utility of WMC to serve as an indicator of cognitive control is context 





cognitive executive functioning in regulating emotions is incomplete without taking into 
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Note. RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; AVI = Affect Valuation Index; BDI = Beck Depression  
Inventory; TAI = Trait Anxiety Index; PSS = Perceived Stress Scale; EPI = Eysenck Personality 
Inventory; BAS = Behavioral Activation System; SCS = Self-Control Scale; BIS = Behavioral 
Inhibition System; ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.  
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
 Negative- Approach Avoidance Self- Regulatory 
  Positive Orientation Orientation Structure Styles 
  Emotionality 
    Self-esteem (RSES) -.817 -.012 .138 -.006 -.066 
Negative trait affect (AVI) .806 .061 -.162 -.044 .079 
Depression (BDI-II) .783 .221 -.140 -.096 .010 
Trait Anxiety (TAI) .780 .073 .219 -.090 .102 
Positive Trait Affect (AVI) -.768 .095 .106 -.082 .244 
Stress (PSS) .742 .268 .137 -.056 .010 
Neuroticism (EPI) .728 .225 .045 -.178 .114 
Activation: Fun (BAS) -.227 .717 -.307 .119 .030 
Activation: Drive (BAS) -.299 .699 .108 .045 .112 
Extraversion (EPI) -.351 .668 -.205 .071 -.189 
Activation: Reward (BAS) -.237 .562 .439 -.254 .256 
Self-control (SCS) -.448 -.557 .452 -.006 .075 
Avoidance (BIS) .398 .048 .697 -.303 .071 
Compartmentalization .134 .162 .422 .700 .150 
Self-concept negativity .486 -.037 .097 .614 .154 
Differential importance -.153 .214 .318 .375 -.351 
Emotion Suppression (ERQ) .018 -.262 -.340 .233 .688 







Study 3: Correlations between Emotionality Variables and Working Memory Capacity by Mood 
Condition   
 
                                                                 WMC Correlations by Condition   
Variable   Nervous  Sad Excited Calm 
 
Negative-positive emotionality   
 Self-esteem (RSES) .28
*
 -.06 .11 .11 
 Negative trait affect (AVI) -.32
*
 .28
* .13 -.11 
 Depression (BDI-II) -.25
†
 .16 .07 -.05 
 Trait anxiety (TAI) -.24
†
 .11 -.08 -.09 
 Positive trait affect (AVI) .23 -.02 -.14 -.11 
 Stress (PSS) -.16 .36
**
 -.01 .09 




 -.11 -.06 
      
Approach orientation      
 Activation: Fun (BAS) -.01 -.21   -.28
* .06 
 Activation: Drive (BAS) .03 -.09 -.22 .10 
 Extraversion (EPI) .01 -.13 -.15 -.24
† 
 Activation: Reward (BAS) .07 -.04 -.03 .14 
 Self-control (SCS) .23 -.20 .08 -.03 
      
Avoidance orientation      
 BIS -.14 .15 .08 .03 
      
Regulatory styles      
 Emotion suppression (ERQ) -.07 -.22 -.16 -.02 
 Emotion reappraisal (ERQ) .12 .05 .15 .02 
      
 MAOSPAN 48.57 46.41   44.70  46.35 
 SDAOSPAN 17.70 17.66 17.57 16.21 
 N 49 47 51 48 
      
Notes. RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; AVI = Affect Valuation Index; BDI = Beck 
Depression Inventory; TAI = Trait Anxiety Index; PSS = Perceived Stress Scale; EPI = 
Eysenck Personality Inventory; BAS = Behavioral Activation System; SCS = Self-Control 
Scale; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System; ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.  
†
p ≤ .10; 
*



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Study 3. Hierarchical Regression Analyses: Mood x Self-Concept Organization 





































is the proportion of unique variance of each predictor, beyond the variance of 
all other variables on that step. The sign of sr signifies the direction of the association 
between the predictor and criterion. Reported R
2
 are cumulative. 
*
p ≤ .05; 
**
p ≤ .01; 
***








Step 1  .02   
 Compartmentalization (Phi)  .00   .06 
 Differential importance (DI)  .00 -.05 
 Negative self-beliefs (Neg)  .01 -.12 
 Condition valence   .01 -.09 
 Condition arousal   .00   .01 
Step 2  .04   
 Phi x DI  .00 -.02 
 Phi x Neg  .00   .05 
 Phi x Valence  .00   .06 
 Phi x Arousal  .00   .06 
 DI x Neg  .00   .02 
 DI x Valence  .00 -.07 
 DI x Arousal  .00 -.06 
 Neg x Valence  .00 -.03 
 Neg x Arousal  .00 -.07 
 Val x Arousal  .00 -.03 
Step 3  .08   
 Phi x DI x Neg  .01   .08 
 Phi x DI x Valence  .00 -.03 
 Phi x DI x Arousal  .02 -.13 
 Phi x Neg x Valence  .00 -.04 
 Phi x Neg x Arousal  .01   .11 
 Phi x Valence x Arousal  .01 -.09 
 DI x Neg x Valence  .00   .07 
 DI x Neg x Arousal  .00   .02 
 DI x Valence x Arousal  .00   .06 
 Neg x Valence x Arousal  .00   .06 
Step 4  .13   
 Phi x DI x Neg x Valence  .02  .13 
 Phi x DI x Neg x Arousal  .00  .00 
 Phi x DI x Valence x Arousal  .02 -.13 
 Phi x Neg x Valence x Arousal  .03* -.17* 
 DI x Neg x Valence x Arousal  .01  .12 







Study 1. Multiple Regressions Predicting Baseline WMC Using 















    
Neg-Pos Emotionality   .24
†
    .06
†
    .24
†
 
Happy Rating   .37
**
    .12
**
    .34
**
 
Arousal Rating  -.15    .02   -.14 
     
   .09
 
    
Approach Orientation  -.05 .00   -.04 




    .29
*
 
Arousal Rating  -.14 .02   -.13 
     
    Note. N = 62. Negative-positive emotionality is a composite measure 
of AVI negative trait affect, EPI neuroticism, BDI, BIS, PSS, RSES, 
TAI, AVI positive trait affect, and RSES. Approach orientation is a 
composite measure of BAS fun, reward, and drive subscales and EPI 









Figure 1.  Affect valuation items (Tsai, 2007) displayed within  an affect circumplex 
(Ditzfeld & Showers, 2013; Russell & Barrett, 1999). 
High Arousal (HA)
Low Arousal (LA)







































Figure 2. Predicted values for the interaction between evaluative self-structure (phi) 
and self-concept negativity (neg) in association with positive-negative emotionality 
at values 1 SD above and below the sample means. High values indicate greater 





























































































































Positive Mood Conditions 
Low Arousal (Calm)
High Arousal (Excited)
Figure 3. Predicted values displaying working memory capacity as a function of mood condition 
and negative-positive emotionality. Negative and positive emotionally represent values1 SD above 



















































































































Figure 4. Predicted values displaying working memory capacity as a function of mood-condition 
arousal, negative-positive emotionality, and emotion-reappraisal. Negative and positive 
emotionally represent values at 1 SD above and below the sample negative-positive emotionality 
variable mean, respectively. High and low emotional reappraisal ability represent values 1 SD 


















































































































































Figure 5. Predicted values displaying working memory capacity as a function of mood 
condition, approach orientation, and emotion-reappraisal. High and low approach orientation 
represent values 1 SD above and below the sample mean on the avoidance orientation factor 
variable, respectively. High and low emotional reappraisal ability represent values 1 SD 






   
































































































































Figure 6. Predicted values displaying working memory capacity as a function of evaluative self-
organization, self-concept negativity, and mood condition. Compartmentalization and integration 
represent values 1 SD above and below the sample mean on the evaluative self-structure variable 
(phi), respectively. High and low self-concept negativity values 1 SD above and below the sample 
mean on the proportion of negative self-content.  
 
 
 
 
